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1Summary
In this paper I will discuss the external competences of the Community in general
and in relations to the WTO Agreement and the Agreements covered by it.  I will
limit my discussion to the competences of the Community under pillar I of the
European Union.
The WTO Agreement1 consists of preamble and 16 Articles regulating the
scope and functions of the WTO, its institutional structure, legal status and
relations with other organizations, decision-making procedures and membership.
Its legal complexity derives from the additional 29 Agreements and
Understandings listed in the 4 Annexes to the WTO Agreement and from its
inclusion into the Final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations.2
The main aim of the Agreement is to promote welfare through international
guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination and rule of law in the field of
worldwide economic relations.
The WTO Agreement established the WTO, which is an international
organization.  It has the purpose of administrating trade agreements, act as a
forum for trade negotiations, settling trade disputes, reviewing national trade
policies, assisting developing counties in trade policy issues, and cooperate with
other international organization.3
There is a fundamental difference between the WTO and the Community.
The European Community is a supranational body, which is based on the notion
that the MS have transferred their sovereignty in certain fields to the Community,
while the WTO, on the other hand is an international organisation and no
transferral of sovereignty has occurred.
My intention by writing this paper is to cast a light on the competences of the
Community regarding the WTO Agreement, contrary to those of the MS, and the
position of the WTO rules in the Community's legal system, the judicial control
and their effects.  I also elaborate on the difference between the WTO Agreement
and other international agreements entered into by the Community and its MS.
While writing this paper I took into consideration the very explicit Opinion
1/94 on the WTO Agreement, which is a book in itself.  In addition to the
Opinion itself I gathered various articles concerning mixed agreements, external
competences of the Community and common commercial policy.  I also refer in
                                                
1 When I refer to the WTO Agreement hereafter I am also referring to the various
Agreements and Understandings, annexed to it, except where I especially make notice of
doing otherwise.
2 See Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The Transformation of the Worlds Trading System through
the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Symposium, The World
Trade Organization and the European Union, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 6,
No 2, Oxford University Press, [1995], p. 190.
3 Trading Into the Future, The World Trade Organization, 2nd ed., revised, [1999],
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/tif.pdf.
2my paper to many articles concerning the Opinion 1/94 itself, the effects of the
WTO Agreements and the impact it has on the Community's legal order.
The structure of the paper is in somewhat similar to the structure of the
Opinion itself and many of the articles I refer to in my writing.  I outline the
Uruguay Round, which lead to the establishment of the WTO Agreement.  I also
outline the objective of the WTO and its structure.  I describe the Multilateral
Trade Agreements, which form and integral part of the WTO Agreement and
contracting parties must take over if they accede to the WTO.  This is the so-
called "single pack" concept.
In addition I discuss the external competences of the Community in general.
I outline the concept of express external powers and the principle of implied
external powers and the development o the concept through case law.  The
division of external competences between the Community and the MS are also
addressed and on what principles that division is based and outline under what
condition the exclusive competences of the Community may occur.  The concept
of mixed agreements is discussed in length, the many types of mixed agreements
and the various difficulties and problems relating to such agreements.  This
discussion is important for, as already stated the Court, in Opinion 1/94
concluded that most part of the GATS and almost all of the TRIPS fell under the
notion of mixed agreement.
I elaborate on the competences of the Court to interpret the provisions of the
WTO Agreement.  I discuss the judicial control from the perspective of
preliminary rulings and action for annulment brought by the MS under Article 230
EC.  Those are the most practical possibilities of reviewing the legality of
Community acts for it can be very troublesome for legal and natural persons to
prove that they are individually and directly concerned parties.  If a case, on the
other hand, is brought to the Court under Article 234 EC no such analysis has to
take place, and under Article 230 EC the MS are a privilege parties and do not
have to show that they are individually and directly concerned.
The fact that the Court came to the conclusion that the WTO Agreement was
a mixed one evoked many difficult questions regarding the jurisdiction of the
Court to interpret its provision, and before long cases concerning that problem
were brought under the Court.
Concerning implied powers of the Community the Court made it clear that
the MS only loose their power to enter into agreements with third countries to the
extent that common rules had been established within the Community, which
might be affected by such an agreement.  Only where common rules have been
laid down internally does the Community's competence become exclusive.  The
Court also pointed out that there was nothing in the Treaty to prevent the
institutions from establishing, within the framework of common rules, a concerted
approach to third countries or from laying down the approach to be taken by MS
to the outside world.  On the contrary, the Court emphasized the duty of co-
operation between the Community and the MS, not least because of the nature of
the WTO Agreement and the possibility of cross retaliation, which it offers.
3In subsequent case law the Court has clarified the jurisdiction of the Court to
interpret provisions of the WTO Agreement.  In Portuguese textile case,
Hermés case and last but not lastly, in the Dior case, on can assume that the
Court has jurisdiction to interpret procedural provisions, such as Article 50 of the
TRIPS Agreement, which should be applied in the same way in every situation
falling within its scope and is capable of applying both to situations covered by
national law and to situations covered by Community law.  This is based on the
need, for practical and legal reasons, that the judicial bodies of the MS and the
Community give a uniform interpretation.
The Court on the other hand did not clearly write-off the possibility of the
Courts jurisdiction regarding provisions of the WTO Agreement, falling
exclusively under MS competences.
The Court has also developed and modified the effects of the WTO
Agreement from the GATT 1947, which was bluntly denied of direct effect within
the Community's legal order.  In the most recent case law concerning Article 50
of the TRIPS Agreement the Court has denied it of direct effect but nevertheless
it seems to have accepted "indirect effect" of the provisions of the WTO
Agreement, by stating that when judicial authorities of the MS are required by
virtues of Community law, when called upon to apply national rules with a view to
ordering provisional measures for the protection or rights falling within such a
field, to do so as far as possible in the light of the working and purpose of Article
50 of the TRIPS Agreement.  Concerning fields not falling within the scope of
Community law the Court has ruled that the Community law neither requires not
forbids the national courts to rely directly on the rule laid down by Article 50 of
the TRIPS Agreement or to oblige the national courts to apply that rule of their
own motion.
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51 Introduction
Since the signing of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) in 1993 the
European Union has been base on three "pillars".  The European Community falls
under the so-called pillar I.  Under the terms of the TEU the two pillars on the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and on Justice and Home Affairs
(JHA) differ from pillar I for they do not share the institutional structure, law-
making processes, or legal instruments of the Community pillar, largely beyond
the jurisdiction of the Court and lacking the key Community law characteristics of
supremacy and direct effect.4  Therefore the two latter pillars are more in line with
traditional international law, rather than sharing the supranational characteristics of
the European Community.
It is important to note that the European Union itself has no external
competences of its own.  The Council, on the other hand, exercises the external
competences on behalf of the Communities.
In this paper I will discuss the external competences of the Community in
general and in relations to the WTO Agreement and the Agreements covered by
it.  I will limit my discussion to the competences of the Community under pillar I of
the European Union.
The WTO Agreement5 consists of preamble and 16 Articles regulating the
scope and functions of the WTO, its institutional structure, legal status and
relations with other organizations, decision-making procedures and membership.
Its legal complexity derives from the additional 29 Agreements and
Understandings listed in the 4 Annexes to the WTO Agreement and from its
inclusion into the Final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations.6
The main aim of the Agreement is to promote welfare through international
guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination and rule of law in the field of
worldwide economic relations.
The WTO Agreement established the WTO, which is an international
organization.  It has the purpose of administrating trade agreements, act as a
forum for trade negotiations, settling trade disputes, reviewing national trade
policies, assisting developing counties in trade policy issues, and cooperate with
other international organization.7
                                                
4 Craig, Paul, de Búrca, Gráinne, EU Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, sec.ed., Oxford
University Press, [1998], p.3.
5 When I refer to the WTO Agreement hereafter I am also referring to the various
Agreements and Understandings, annexed to it, except where I especially make notice of
doing otherwise.
6 See Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The Transformation of the Worlds Trading System through
the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Symposium, The World
Trade Organization and the European Union, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 6,
No 2, Oxford University Press, [1995], p. 190.
7 Trading Into the Future, The World Trade Organization, 2nd ed., revised, [1999],
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/tif.pdf.
6There is a fundamental difference between the WTO and the Community.
The European Community is a supranational body, which is based on the notion
that the MS have transferred their sovereignty in certain fields to the Community,
while the WTO, on the other hand is a international organisation and no transferral
of sovereignty has occurred.
My intention by writing this paper is to cast a light on the competences of the
Community regarding the WTO Agreement, contrary to those of the MS, and the
position of the WTO rules in the Community's legal system, the judicial control
and their effects.  I also elaborate on the difference between the WTO Agreement
and other international agreements entered into by the Community and its MS.
While writing this paper I took into consideration the very explicit Opinion
1/94 on the WTO Agreement, which is a book in itself.  In the extensive Opinion
the Court8 came to the conclusion that all of the Multilateral Agreement on Trade
in Goods fell within the common commercial policy and therefore within the
exclusive competences of the Community.  The Court, on the other hand,
concluded that a large part of GATS and almost all of TRIPS fell outside the
scope of the common commercial policy and that the Community and the MS had
shared the competences to conclude those Agreements.
In addition to the Opinion itself I gathered various articles concerning mixed
agreements, external competences of the Community and common commercial
policy.  I also refer in my paper to many articles concerning the Opinion 1/94
itself, the effects of the WTO Agreements and the impact it has on the
Community's legal order.
The structure of the paper is in somewhat similar to the structure of the
Opinion itself and many of the articles I refer to in my writing.  In Chapter 2 I
outline the Uruguay Round, which lead to the establishment of the WTO
Agreement.  I also outline the objective of the WTO and its structure.  Then I
describe the Multilateral Trade Agreements, which form and integral part of the
WTO Agreement and contracting parties must take over if they accede to the
WTO.  This is the so-called "single pack" concept.
In Chapter 3 I discuss the external competences of the Community in
general.  I outline the concept of express external powers and the principle of
implied external powers and the development o the concept through case law.
I also outline the division of external competences between the Community
and the MS and on what principles that division is based and outline under what
condition the exclusive competences of the Community may occur.  I discuss the
concept of mixed agreements in length, the many types of mixed agreements and
the various difficulties and problems relating to such agreements.  This discussion
is important for, as already stated the Court, in Opinion 1/94 concluded that most
part of the GATS and almost all of the TRIPS fell under the notion of mixed
agreement.
                                                
8 When I refer to the Court in this paper I do not distinguish between the ECJ and the CFI,
except where I especially state otherwise.
7In Chapter 4 I discuss and outline in length the very important Opinion 1/94
on the WTO Agreement.  In my discussion I stick to the approach exercised by
the Court and draw out the main points of the ruling.
I elaborate on the competences of the Court to interpret the provisions of the
WTO Agreement.  I discuss the judicial control from the perspective of
preliminary rulings and action for annulment brought by the MS under Article 230
EC.  Those are the most practical possibilities of reviewing the legality of
Community acts for it can be very troublesome for legal and natural persons to
prove that they are individually and directly concerned parties.  If a case, on the
other hand, is brought to the Court under Article 234 EC no such analysis has to
take place, and under Article 230 EC the MS are a privilege parties and do not
have to show that they are individually and directly concerned.
 I outline the effect of WTO Agreement within the Community's legal order
and whether the Court has jurisdiction to review the legality of community acts
based on the provisions of the WTO Agreement and whether WTO stipulation
confer rights upon legal or natural persons which can be based on in the Court or
the national courts.
Finally in Chapter 5 I conclude my discussions and draw my earlier
discussion together and outline my conclusion.
82 The Uruguay round - World
Trade Organization
On the April 15, 1994, the WTO Agreement was signed in Marrakesh,9
Morocco, by 124 governments and the Community.10 The president of the
Council and Mr. Leon Brittan, member of the Commission signed the agreement
on behalf of the Council of the European Communities and representatives from
the MS signed the agreement on their behalf.11  Since the signature in April 1994
many states have joined, and currently the number of MS are 14412 and there are
between twenty and thirty candidate countries.13
The signature of the WTO Agreement market the end of the so called
Uruguay round, which spanned the years, from 1986 to 1994.  The Uruguay
round was the seventh intergovernmental trade negotiations, or rounds held under
GATT, since the signing of the GATT Agreement in Havana in 1947.14  The
Uruguay round included a major revision of the original GATT Agreement.  The
amendments made to the original GATT Agreement where significant and
therefore, after the Uruguay Round the amended GATT Agreement has been
referred to as GATT 1994 to distinguish it from the original Agreement.15
The original GATT did only cover trade in goods and there was no
international organization that covered the agreement.  The fruitful negotiations
added other international trade agreements to the GATT and a special agreement
on the establishment of the WTO.16
                                                
9  Denza, Eileen, The Community as a Member of International Organization, The European
Union and Worlds Trade Law, After the GATT Uruguay Round, John Wiley & Sons, (1996),
p. 3
10 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The Transformation of the Worlds Trading System through the
1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Symposium, The World
Trade Organization and the European Union, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 6,
No 2, Oxford University Press, [1995], p. 190.
11 Emiliou, Nicholas, The Death of Exclusive Competence? European Law Review, Vol. 21,
No 4, August, Sweet & Maxwell, [1996], p. 297 and Denza, Eileen, The Community as a
Member of International Organizations, The European Union and World Trade Law After
the GATT Uruguay Round, ed. by Emiliou, Nicolas, O'Keeffe, David, John Wiley & Sons,
[1996], 13-14.
12 As of January 1, 2002.
13 Trading Into the Future, The World Trade Organization, 2nd ed., revised, [1999],
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/tif.pdf.
14 Denza, Eileen, The Community as a Member of International Organization, The European
Union and Worlds Trade Law, After the GATT Uruguay Round, John Wiley & Sons, (1996),
p. 3
15 In this paper I will refer to GATT 1994 as the GATT, unless further clarification is needed.
16 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The Transformation of the Worlds Trading System through the
1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Symposium, The World
Trade Organization and the European Union, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 6,
No 2, Oxford University Press, [1995], p. 190.
9A number of multilateral trade agreements17 that are an integral part of the
WTO agreement and are designed to be binding on all WTO members, are listed
in the tree first Annexes.  The agreements are, in addition to GATT, the GATS,18
the TRIPS Agreement,19 the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes,20 and finally the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.21  It
was also agreed on plurilateral trade agreements,22 which are not an integral part
of WTO and are only binding on those WTO members that have accepted them.
The aforementioned multilateral trade agreements are annexed to the WTO
Agreement and together it makes immense magnitude of 22.000 pages.23
Therefore it is understandable that the negotiations have been described as the
most complex trade negotiations in the history.
2.1 WTO
2.1.1 Objectives
The main task of the WTO is to increase free flow of trade and remove
hindrances to international trade. The WTO encompasses this by administering
trade agreements and acting as a forum for trade negotiations.  It offers also
dispute settlement procedures,24 which is an integral part of the agreement. More
than 167 cases where brought to the WTO by March 1999 compared to some
300 disputes dealt with during the entire life of GATT.25 The review of national
trade policies plays also a vital role.26  The review, brought out by the WTO
secretariat, which is to analyse national policies and insure that they are in
uniformity with the agreement.27
The WTO assists the developing countries in trade policy issues to make
them more compatible.  There are also many other projects designed for the
developing countries under the agreement and they have also been granted
derogations to take up WTO rules so they can have more time for their
economies to adjust to free trade.  The WTO is also to use its mandate to "make
appropriate arrangements for effective cooperation with other intergovernmental
                                                
17  The Multilateral Trade Agreements will be outlined in chapter 2.2.
18 Annex 1B WTO.
19 Annex 1C WTO.
20 Annex 2 WTO.
21 Annex 3 WTO.
22 Annex 4 WTO.
23 Emiliou, Nicholas, The Death of Exclusive Competence? European Law Review, Vol. 21,
No 4, August, Sweet & Maxwell, [1996], p. 294.
24 The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes it
outlined in chapter 2.2.4.
25 Trading Into the Future, The World Trade Organization, 2nd ed., revised, [1999],
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/tif.pdf.
26 The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes is
outlined in chapter 2.2.4.
27 Over 54 members have been reviewed since the WTO came into force as of March 1999.
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organizations that have responsibilities related to those of the WTO", and to
"make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-
governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO".
The WTO fulfils this obligation for example by its cooperation with other
international organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund.28
2.1.2 Structure
The WTO is an intergovernmental organisation, contrary to the supranational
character of the Community.  Its decisions are made by the entire membership,
usually by consensus.  A majority vote is also possible but it has never been used
in the WTO, and as extremely rare under the WTO’s predecessor, GATT.
The Ministerial Conference is the top decision making body of the WTO.
It meets at least once every two years.  The prime ministers or foreign ministers of
the MS sit in the Ministerial Conference.  Next in line is the General Council,
which normally consists of ambassadors and heads of delegation in Geneva, but
sometimes officials sent from the MS.  The General Council meets several times a
year in the WTO headquarters in Geneva.
Then there is the Goods Council, Services Council and Intellectual
Property Council, which report to the General Council.  Finally there are
numerous specialized committees, working groups and working parties dealing
with individual agreements and other areas such as the environment, development,
membership applications and regional trade agreements.29
The WTO Secretariat is based in Geneva.  It has around 55030 staff
members and is headed by a Director General.31  It does not have any decision-
making role since the Contracting Parties themselves take all decisions.  The
Secretariat’s main duty is to supply technical support for the various councils and
committees and the ministerial conferences, to provide technical assistance for
developing countries, to analyse the world trade, and to explain WTO affairs to
the public.  The Secretariat also provides some forms of legal assistance in the
                                                
28 See further discussion on the WTO cooperation with the Bretton Woods institutions and
other UN Institutions, Specialized Agencies and Multilateral Agreements in Petersmann,
Ernst-Ulrich, The Transformation of the Worlds Trading System through the 1994
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Symposium, The World Trade
Organization and the European Union, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 6, No 2,
Oxford University Press, [1995], p. 211-214.
29 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The Transformation of the Worlds Trading System through the
1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Symposium, The World
Trade Organization and the European Union, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 6,
No 2, Oxford University Press, [1995], p. 193-195 and Trading Into the Future, The World
Trade Organization, 2nd ed., revised, [1999],
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/tif.pdf.
30 Trading Into the Future, The World Trade Organization, 2nd ed., revised, [1999],
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/tif.pdf.
31 The current Director General is Mr. Mike Moore.
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dispute settlement process and advises governments wishing to become members
of the WTO.32
2.2 Multilateral Trade Agreements
As discussed the WTO agreement and connected agreements can be described
as two folded.
Firstly there are the multilateral trade agreements, which are an integral part
of the WTO agreement and are designed to be binding on all WTO Contracting
Parties.  This can be described as a "single package". 33
Then there are the plurilateral trade agreements, which are not an integral
part of WTO and are only binding on those WTO members that have accepted
them. The latter type of agreement relates respectively to Agreement on Trade in
Civil Aircraft, Agreement on Government Procurement, International Dairy
Agreement and International Bovine Meat Agreement.34 I will not discuss the
plurilateral agreements further in this paper.
2.2.1 The Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods -
GATT 1994
The GATT 1994 is to a large extent based on the provisions of GATT 1947.
Even though the WTO Agreement does not formally amend the GATT 1947, the
legal substance of GATT 1994 differs from that of GATT 1947 in many respects
for a number of reasons.35
The GATT Agreement is based on few basic principles that the MS must
follow.  These principles are the fundamental rules that apply for international
trade between the MS of the WTO.
Firstly, there is the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment, which is the
fundamental principle of the GATT.36 According to the principle each contracting
                                                
32 Trading Into the Future, The World Trade Organization, 2nd ed., revised, [1999],
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/tif.pdf.
33 See Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The Transformation of the Worlds Trading System through
the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Symposium, The World
Trade Organization and the European Union, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 6,
No 2, Oxford University Press, [1995], p. 191, and Pescatore, Pierre, Opinion 1/94 on
"Conclusion" of The WTO Agreement: Is There an Escape From a Programmed Disaster?
Common Market Law Review, Vol. 36, No 2, Kluwer Law International, [1999], p. 389.
34 Emiliou, Nicholas, The Death of Exclusive Competence? European Law Review, Vol. 21,
No 4, August, Sweet & Maxwell, [1996], p. 297.
35 See Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The Transformation of the Worlds Trading System through
the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Symposium, The World
Trade Organization and the European Union, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 6,
No 2, Oxford University Press, [1995], p. 195-200, where he discusses what differs in GATT
1994 from the GATT 1947, and the objectives of the GATT 1994 and the other Agreements
falling under Annex 1A.
36 GATT Article 1.
12
party to the GATT is required to provide to all other contracting parties the same
conditions of trade as the most favourable terms it extends to any one of them.
This means that each contracting party is required to treat all contracting parties in
the same way that it treats its "most-favoured-nation".  One first sight one could
assume that the Community were infringing those principles by not applying the
same terms in trade with third countries as the common commercial policy and the
internal market, offers to trade within the Community.
This is not the case for there are exemptions from those important
principles.37  An extremely important exception as far as the Community is
concerned is the exception in Article XXIV(4)-(8) GATT and Article 5V and 5a
GATS, relating to the formation of customs unions and free trade areas, which
satisfy certain conditions.   According to those exceptions the Community is not
obliged to grant the advantages they accord each others through the common
commercial policy and the internal market to all their GATT/WTO partners.38
Secondly, there is the national treatment principle.39  It condemns
discrimination between foreign and national goods.  According to the principle
imported goods, once duties have been paid, must be given the same treatment as
domestic products, in relation to any charges, taxes, and administrative rules and
other regulations.
Thirdly, there is the principle of Transparency.40  If barriers to trade are to be
reduced through the process of negotiations, the system of trade must be
transparent.  Therefor the use of quotas is limited.  There are though excemptions,
e.g. in the some specific sectors such as agriculture.  In addition, notifications from
contracting parties, are required, on their agricultural and trade policies so that
these policies can be examined by other contracting parties to ensure that they are
compatible to the Agreement.
Fourthly, there is the Tariff binding and reduction principle.  When GATT
was established, tariffs were the main form of trade protection, and negotiations in
the early years focused primarily upon tariff binding and reduction. The text of the
GATT lays out the obligations of the contracting parties in this regard.
Finaly, there is the principle of prohibition on quantitative restrictions.
However, in some cases, such as safeguard action, quantitative restrictions can be
introduced under strictly defined criteria.
Under Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement there are other 12 Multilateral
Trade Agreements, which interpret, modify and supplement GATT 1994 in
various respects.41  I will though not discuss these Agreements further.
                                                
37 Kapteyn, P.J.G., VerLoren, P. van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European
Communities, 3rd ed., Kluwer Law International, [1998], p. 1286.
38 Id.
39 GATT Article 3.
40 GATT Article 10.
41 See Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The Transformation of the Worlds Trading System through
the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Symposium, The World
Trade Organization and the European Union, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 6,
No 2, Oxford University Press, [1995], p. 196-200, and Hyett, Stephen, The Uruguay Round
of the GATT: The United Kingdom Standpoint, in Emiliou, Nicolas, O'Keeffe, David (eds.),
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2.2.2 GATS
GATS, which stands for general agreement on trade in services, is a manifestation
of an attempt to expand the principles of GATT into the field of services.42  The
motivation for the agreement came mainly from the developed countries, as with
TRIPS, for the export of those countries are more and more switching over to
services with high value added knowledge component, instead of the traditional
industrial products.43
According to Article I(3)(b) and (c) of GATS the concept of service is very
wide since it covers "any service in any sector except services supplied in the
exercise of governmental authority", but that is any service which is supplied
neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service
suppliers.
Trade in services is divided in four types or varieties, according to Article
I(2) of GATS.  The types are as follows:  1.  Cross-border supply:  the supply of
a service from the territory of one member country into the territory of any other
member country;44 2.  Consumption abroad:  the supply of a service in the
territory of one member country to the service consumer of any other member
country;45 3.  Commercial presence:  the supply of a service by a service supplier
of one member country, through commercial presence in the territory of any other
member country;46 4.  The movement of persons:  the supply of a service by a
service supplier of one member country through the presence of natural persons
of that member country in the territory of any other member country.47
The nature of the obligations on the Contracting Parties of GATS are
basically two folded.  There are the general obligations on one hand and the
specific commitments on the other.
The general obligations of GATS are up to a point parallel to the main
principles of GATT.  The most important obligation is for example the most-
                                                                                                                           
The European Union and World Trade Law After the GATT Uruguay Round, John Wiley &
Sons, [1996], p. 91-92.
42 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The Dispute Settlement of the World Trade Organization and
the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1947, Common Market Law
Review, Vol. 31, No 6, Kluwer Law International, [1994], p. 200-201.
43 See Arnull, Anthony, The Scope of the Common commercial policy: A Coda on Opinion
1/94, in Emiliou, Nicolas, O'Keeffe, David (eds.), The European Union and World Trade Law
After the GATT Uruguay Round, John Wiley & Sons, [1996], p. 344.
44 See opinion 1/94 where the Council gives the following example:  A firm of architects
established in country A supplies an electrical installation project to a firm of engineers
established in country B.
45 See opinion 1/94 where the following example is given:  Services supplied in country A to
tourists from country B.
46 See opinion 1/94 where the Council gives the following example:  A supply and
establishment of services in country B by undertakings or professionals from country B.
Banking service is an example of this.
47 See opinion 1/94 where the Council gives the following example:  An undertaking form
country A supplies services in country B by means of workers coming from country A, such
as in construction work.
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favoured-nation treatment.48 There are though exemptions from the principle, both
permanent and limited in time.  The GATS, deals however with national treatment
under Part III, due to the special nature of trade in services.   According to those
rules national treatment becomes a negotiated concession and may be subject to
conditions or qualifications that Contracting Parties have inscribed in their
schedules on specific commitments in trade in services.49
 Another set of principles, which are parallel to GATT are the obligation of
transparency and to provide for judicial, arbitral or administrative procedures
(remedies) for the review of administrative decisions affecting trade in services.50
Contracting Parties are also to ensure that any monopoly supplier of a service in
its territory does not act in a manner inconsistent with the principle of most-
favoured nation treatment or with its specific commitments.  Finally, there are
obligations in respect of the recognition of the authorisation, licensing or
certification of services suppliers.
2.2.3 TRIPS
The TRIPS Agreement is the most important treaty, worldwide, concerning
intellectual property and it sets the relatively high standard of intellectual right
protection throughout the world.
Some of the world's largest industries (pharmaceutical, agri-food, computer
software, entertainment, luxury goods) depend on effective protection of their
intellectual property rights.  The drafters of the TRIPS Agreement realized that
and also that a fundamental alternation of the intellectual property could therefore
have serious aftermath for those industries and the transition cost would be
enormous.  The TRIPS negotiators therefore choose to look at the existing rules
and update them instead of creating new ones.  The Paris Convention, the Bern
Convention, the International Convention on the Protection of Performers,
Producers of Phonograms and the Rome Convention, and the Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits (which never entered into
force) were taken under scrutiny while drafting the TRIPS Agreement51 and the
negotiators used the existing conventions as a logical point of departure.52 The
TRIPs only sets the minimal standard of Intellectual Property Rights protection
and individual MS are allowed to implement legislation guaranteeing higher level
of protection.53
                                                
48 GATS Article II(1),
49 GATS Article XVII.
50 GATS Article VI(2).
51 However, individual Member States are not required under the TRIPS Agreement to
accede to these intellectual propriety conventions.
52 Gervais, Daniel, The TRIPS Agreement, Drafting History and Analysis, Sweet & Maxwell,
[1998].  See discussion on the logic of TRIPS p. 25-28.
53 See Intellectual Property and the Knowledge Gap, Oxfam Policy Papers, Oxfam
Discussion Paper 12/1., where it is stated that bilateral trade agreements such as the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) are also being used to ratchet up national IP standards
to even higher levels than those required by TRIPS.
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The Agreement is divided into seven parts and preamble and annexes.  In the
first part the general provisions and basic principles of the Agreement are
outlined.
The TRIPS Agreement is extremely wide in scope, since it covers both
literary and artistic property and industrial property.54 It also lays down the
principles55 of national treatment56 and most-favoured-national treatment.57 There
are certain exceptions to those two principles.  The principle of national treatment
is subject to the exceptions already provided in the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary an Artistic Works, the Rome Convention for the Protection of
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations and the
Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.
Furthermore, the national treatment obligation is restricted, as regards performers
of phonograms and broadcasting organizations, to the rights provided by the
TRIPS itself.
The TRIPS Agreement attempts to achieve its objects by applying two
methods.  In its provisions it refers to international conventions, which up to a
point have achieved a wide acceptance as a customary international law.  On the
other hand it is equipped with certain substantive provisions in the field of
intellectual property rights.
As stated above the fundamental principles of national treatment and most-
favoured-national treatment, are not without an exemption.  According to Article
6 of the TRIPS Agreement the dispute settlement provisions of the TRIPS cannot
be invoked in the case of a TRIPS Contracting Party applying the principle of
"national" exhaustion or regionally exhaustion for customs unions or free trade
areas.  This exemption is parallel to the exhaustion from the principles of national
treatment and most-favoured-national treatment in the GATT and GATS
Agreements.
2.2.4 Dispute settlement procedural agreements
The DSU (Dispute Settlement Understanding)58 offers a unified system for dispute
settlements arising under the agreements covered by WTO, both the multilateral
                                                
54 Opinion 1/94, p. I-5295.  The Agreement covers industrial property rights such as
trademarks, geographical indications of provenance and origin, patents, designs and models
and know-how.
55 See Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The Transformation of the Worlds Trading System through
the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Symposium, The World
Trade Organization and the European Union, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 6,
No 2, Oxford University Press, [1995], p. 205-206, and Hyett, Stephen, The Uruguay Round
of the GATT: The United Kingdom Standpoint, in Emiliou, Nicolas, O'Keeffe, David (eds.),
The European Union and World Trade Law After the GATT Uruguay Round, John Wiley &
Sons, [1996], p. 92-93.
56 TRIPS Article 3.
57 TRIPS Article 4.
58 See Article 1 and Appendix 1 of the DSU.
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and plurilateral trade agreements.  In that way the WTO differs from all other
worldwide organizations by its mandatory and effective system for the legally
binding settlement of disputes among its Contracting Parties.59 In addition it
introduces a number of innovations to ensure that WTO dispute settlement
proceeding lead to a legally binding ruling by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
within 9 months after the establishment of a panel or, in case of an appeal to the
new Appellate Body, within 12 months.60
 The DSU is an integrated dispute settlement system applicable to the WTO
Agreement, and all the multilateral as the prulitateral trade Agreements.  The
integrated system enables WTO Contracting Parties to base their complaints on
any of the covered Agreements.  It also establishes the method of the so-called
"cross-retaliation", which can be used as a last resort.61  That offers the possibility
to a Contracting Parties to redress a breach of any one element of the agreements
as a whole,62 by retaliation in a different sector or under another Agreement.
In Opinion 1/94 the Court stated that the duty to cooperate is all the more
imperative in the case of agreements such as those annexed to the WTO
Agreement, in view of the cross-retaliation measures established by the Dispute
Settlement Understanding.  Thus, in the absence of close cooperation, where a
MS duly authorized within its sphere of competence to take cross-retaliation
measures, considered that they would be ineffective if taken in the fields covered
by GATS or TRIPS, it would not, under Community law, be empowered to
retaliate in the area of trade in goods, since that is an area which on any view falls
within the exclusive competence of the Community under Article 133 EC.63
According to the DSU rules unilateral reprisals are prohibited.  The primary
obligation to withdraw illegal measures, the only subsidiary nature of
compensation pending the withdrawal of illegal measures, and the legal
inadmissibility of unilateral reprisals without prior authorization by the DSB are
explicitly confirmed in the DSU.  The WTO legal and dispute settlement system
therefore limits the scope for unilateral power politics.64
                                                
59 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The Dispute Settlement of the World Trade Organization and
the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1947, Common Market Law
Review, Vol. 31, No 6, Kluwer Law International, [1994], p. 157.
60 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The Transformation of the Worlds Trading System through the
1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Symposium, The World
Trade Organization and the European Union, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 6,
No 2, Oxford University Press, [1995], p. 208.
61 Id.
62 Can be a breach of an element covered by GATT, GATS or TRIPs.
63 Opinion 1/94, para. 109.
64 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The Transformation of the Worlds Trading System through the
1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Symposium, The World
Trade Organization and the European Union, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 6,
No 2, Oxford University Press, [1995], p. 210.
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2.2.5 Trade review agreements
The Trade review mechanism is codified in Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement.65
Its objective is to:66 a) provide greater transparency of national laws and
practices; b) to contribute to improved adherence by all members to rules,
disciplines and commitments, and: c) to examine the impact of a Member's trade
policies and practices on the multilateral trading system.
The Trade review mechanism is not intended to serve as a "basis for the
enforcement of specific obligations under the Agreements, or for dispute
settlement procedures, or to impose new policy commitments on Members."67
Nevertheless its objective is to increase transparency of national trade.
The so-called TPRB,68 which is a permanent organ under the WTO
Agreement, was established to administer the Trade review mechanism.  It
reports to the WTO General Council and is responsible for the implementation of
the TPRM and for reporting to the General Council, each year, and information
concerning the developments in the international trading system.69
                                                
65 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The Transformation of the Worlds Trading System through the
1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Symposium, The World
Trade Organization and the European Union, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 6,
No 2, Oxford University Press, [1995], p. 211.
66 Emiliou, Nicholas, The Death of Exclusive Competence? European Law Review, Vol. 21,
No 4, August, Sweet & Maxwell, [1996], p. 296.
67 Para. A.i.
68 Trading Into the Future, The World Trade Organization, 2nd ed., revised, [1999], p. 37,
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/tif.pdf.  See Article IV:4 WTO.
69 Emiliou, Nicholas, The Death of Exclusive Competence? European Law Review, Vol. 21,
No 4, August, Sweet & Maxwell, [1996], p. 297.
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3 External Competences of the
Community
3.1 Express external competences
As already stated the European Union has no external competences.  This is for
its lack of legal personality.70  The Council of the European Communities has on
the other hand a legal personality, and therefore it exercises the external
competences of the Community.71
The Community has always had a range of relatively detailed express Treaty
powers in the internal sphere, the same is not true of its external competence, that
is the Community's power to engage in relations with other States and
international associations outside the Community.72 The concept of express
powers can be described as when the exact words of Treaty provision, allocates
specific power to the Community.  According to Article 300 EC the Commission
shall conduct and enter into international agreements, where the Treaty provides
for the conclusion of agreements between the Community and one or more States
or international organisations.73 The external competences appears therefore, at
first glance, to be restricted to expressed external powers in Treaty provision.74
Two of the most significant express treaty-making powers relate to, firstly,
commercial agreements under Article 133 EC and secondly, association
agreements under Article 310 EC.75
Under the original EEC Treaty the express external competences where
limited to the common commercial policy76 in Article 133 EC, which the scope of
                                                
70 Kapteyn, P.J.G., VerLoren, P. van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European
Communities, 3rd ed., Kluwer Law International, [1998], p. 1254.  Only the Communities are
in a position to conclude external agreements, as they are all equipped with legal personality
and the competences to conclude treaties.
71See Case C-327/91, France v. Commission[1994] ECR I-3641., where the Court declared void
the Agreement entered into by the Vice-President of the European Commission, Sir Leon
Brittan, and the United States on enforcement of their respective competition laws.  The
Court held that the Council, not the Commission, has the authority to enter into international
agreements, and that there are no general powers in the field of external relations vested in
the European Commission.
72 Craig, Paul, de Búrca, Gráinne, EU Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, sec.ed., Oxford
University Press, [1998], p.115.
73 See Articles 111, 133, 170, 144(4), 181 and 310 EC.
74 Emiliou, Nicholas, The Death of Exclusive Competence? European Law Review, Vol. 21,
No 4, August, Sweet & Maxwell, [1996], p. 305.
75 Emiliou, Nicholas, The Allocation of Competence Between the EC and its Member States
in the Sphere of External Competences, in Emiliou, Nicolas, O'Keeffe, David (eds.), The
European Union and World Trade Law After the GATT Uruguay Round, John Wiley &
Sons, [1996], p. 31.
76 The common commercial policy will be discussed further in chapter 5.2.
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has been interpreted broadly.77  In addition the Community can under Article 310
EC conclude with one or more States or international organisations agreements
establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common
action and special procedure.
Trough the years the express external competences of the Community has
been extending.  The Community has today a wide range of external competences
in various policy areas such as development policy,78 the environment,79 research
and technology,80 monetary and foreign exchange matters, and the development
of co-operation with third countries in a range of areas such as education, culture,
health, and trans-European network.81
The Community can exercise these external competences by two types of
measures.  The Community can, on one hand, act out unilateral and
independently, be setting up rules, which concern third countries.  On the other
hand it can accede to agreements and international contracts with third countries
or international bodies.
3.2 Implied external competences
The above-mentioned doctrine of express powers is not the only foundation for
external competences of the Community.  The Court has developed through its
ruling the principle of implied external competences.82  The principle first emerged
in relation to internal competences of the Community but has been extended by
the Court to external policy.  The implied external competences of the Community
are tough very much connected to, or parallel to, the internal competences.
Articles 308, 94 and 95 EC may, along with a range of other Treaty Articles,
which expressly establish competence in the internal sphere,  have been used as
legal base for the Community's entry into international relations in fields in which it
has implied external competence, although Article 308 EC in particular is subject
to limits.83
The Court began developing the doctrine of implied external competences in
the famous ERTA case84 and continued its development in the Kramer cases,85
Opinion 1/7586 and Opinion 1/76.87
                                                
77 Opinion 1/94 on the WTO Agreement[1994] ECR I-5267.
78 Article 181 EC.
79 Article 174(4) EC.
80 Article 170 EC.
81 Craig, Paul, de Búrca, Gráinne, EU Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, sec.ed., Oxford
University Press, [1998], p.116.
82 Craig, Paul, de Búrca, Gráinne, EU Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, sec.ed., Oxford
University Press, [1998], p.116.
83 Craig, Paul, de Búrca, Gráinne, EU Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, sec.ed., Oxford
University Press, [1998], p.116.
84 Case 22/70 Commission v. Council [1971] ECR 263.
85 Cases 3,4, and 6/76, Kramer [1976] ECR 1279.
86 Opinion 1/75 Re Local Cost Standard [1975] ECR 1355.
87 Opinion 1/76 on the Draft Agreement Establishing a Laying-up fund for Inland Waterway
Vessels [1977] ECR 741.
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3.2.1 Implied external competences developed by the Court
In the ERTA case88 the Court stated that when the Community has acted out to
implement a common policy under the Treaty, the MS no longer have the right to
take external action in an area, which would affect that common policy.  This
means that the Community treaty power is co-extensive with its internal powers
and thus it cuts across all area of its internal competence listed in Article 3 of the
EC Treaty.89  This is the so-called ERTA doctrine.
In the judgement the Court established four important principles, which were
further developed and outlined in subsequent rulings.  The principles are the
following:90
Firstly there is the principle of general powers.  Article 281 EC provides that
the Community shall have legal personality and that means that in its external
relations the Community enjoys the capacity to establish contractual links with
third countries over the whole field of objectives defined in Part One of the
Treaty.91
Secondly, there is the principle of implied powers, which means that the
powers to enter into a contractual link with third countries as described above,
arises not only from an express conferment by the Treaty.92  Therefore, to
determine in individual case the Community's authority to enter into international
agreements, regard must be had to the whole scheme of the Treaty no less than to
its substantive provisions.93
Thirdly, there is the principle of exclusivity.  The essence of the principle is
that each time the Community, with a view to implementing a common policy
envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, whatever
form these may take, the MS no longer have the right, acting individually or even
collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries which affect those
rules.94
This means that as long as an implied treaty-making power has not been
used, MS retain residual authority to enter into international agreements necessary
                                                
88 Case 22/70 Commission v. Council.  The Commission requested the annulment o the
Council's proceedings regarding the negotiation and conclusion by the Member States of an
international agreement concerning the work of crews of vehicles engaged in international
road transport (AETR).
89 Emiliou, Nicholas, Towards a clearer demarcation line? The division of external
relations power between the Community and Member States, European Law Review, Vol.
19, February, Sweet & Maxwell, [1994], p. 79.
90 See Emiliou, Nicholas, Towards a clearer demarcation line? The division of external
relations power between the Community and Member States, European Law Review, Vol.
19, February, Sweet & Maxwell, [1994], p. 79-81, and Kapteyn, P.J.G., VerLoren, P. van
Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European Communities, 3rd ed., Kluwer Law
International, [1998], p. 1257-1260.
91 Case 22/70, para. 13.
92 Case 22/70, para. 16.
93 Case 22/70, para. 15.
94 Case 22/70, para. 17.
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to achieve a Community aim subject to certain conditions.95 On the other hand, it
is clear that express external competences conferred on the Community, excludes
the MS external competences, whether or not the Community has exercised those
powers or not.96
Fourthly, the ruling established the principle of parallelism, which means that
with regard to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty the system of
internal community measures may not be separated from that of external
relations.97 In other words external competences co-exist with the internal
competences and cannot be separated from them.
In the Kramer cases98 the Court affirmed earlier decision and added that
that while implied external powers could exist even though no internal measures
had been adopted, until Community competences had been exercised, the MS
retained transitional competence to act so long as their actions were compatible
with Community objectives.
The ruling in Opinion 1/7699 extended the implied external competences
doctrine by stating the exclusive external competence could arise when exercised,
without any prior exercise of internal powers, if external action by the MS would
jeopardize that objective.  The case was brought up by the Commission with a
reference to Article 300(1) EC, and asked for the opinion of the Court
concerning an international agreement, which Switzerland was a party to along
with the Community and specific MS.
The Court concluded that it had been necessary to bring Switzerland into the
scheme in question by means of an international agreement.100 The power of the
Community to conclude such an agreement is not expressly laid down in the
Treaty.  Then the Court cited to the Kramer case by stating that authority to
enter into international commitments "may not only arise from an express
attribution by the Treaty, but equally may flow implicitly from its provisions.  The
Court has concluded inter alia that whenever Community law has created for the
institutions of the Community powers within its internal system for the purpose of
attaining a specific objective, the community has authority to enter into the
international commitments necessary for the attainment of that objective even in
the absence of an express provision in that connexion."101
Then the Court continued by stating that this is the situation, particularly in "all
cases in which internal power has already been used in order to adopt measures,
which come within the attainment of common policies.  It is however, not limited
to that eventuality.  Although the internal Community measures are only adopted
                                                
95 See Emiliou, Nicholas, Towards a clearer demarcation line? The division of external
relations power between the Community and Member States, European Law Review, Vol.
19, February, Sweet & Maxwell, [1994], p. 80.
96 See Opinion 1/75 Local Cost Standard [1975] ECR 1355.
97 Case 22/70, para. 19.
98 Cases 3,4, and 6/76 Kramer [1976] ECR 1279.
99 Case 1/76 Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway
vessels [1977] ECR 741.
100 Case 1/76, para. 2.
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when the international agreement is concluded and made enforceable, as is
envisaged in the present case by the proposal for a regulation to be submitted to
the Council by the Commission, the power to bind the Community vis-s-vis third
countries nevertheless flows by implication from the provisions of the Treaty
creating the internal power and in so far as the participation of the Community in
the international agreement is, as here, necessary for the attainment of one of the
objectives of the Community."102
3.2.2 The Courts less expansive approach
Following Opinion 1/94 on the WTO Agreement,103 a less expansive approach
to the Community's exclusive external competence emerged.104 The Opinion was
not in full harmony with the previous case law of the Court on the scope and the
dynamically evolving nature of Community powers in the sphere of the common
commercial policy.105
In the Opinion the Court came to the conclusion that the Community did not
have exclusive competences regarding several components of the GATS and
TRIPS, since those fields where the international action envisaged was not
necessary for the attainment of some internal Community objective, nor would it
further the aims of some internal Community measures.  It is stated that the
opinion has to be considered in the light of the present political climate in many of
the MS and that the Court has is increasingly accepting the concerns of the MS
concerning their sovereignty.106 I will discuss Opinion 1/94, further in Chapter 4.
3.3 Division of external competences between
Membe States and the Community
In most instances the external competences of the Community are shared
with the MS.  That is though far from absolute and on many occasions the
Community has exclusive competences or the MS has exclusive competences.
It is often difficult to determine, under whose competence a given subject
falls.  To answer that question calls for a close scrutiny of the issue in question as
the internal and external competences of the Community.  Below I discuss in
details the different approaches.
                                                
102 Case 1/76, para. 3.
103 Opinion 1/94 is discussed in details in chapter 4.
104 Craig, Paul, de Búrca, Gráinne, EU Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, sec.ed., Oxford
University Press, [1998], p.117.
105 Emiliou, Nicholas, The Death of Exclusive Competence? European Law Review, Vol. 21,
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3.3.1 Exclusive competences of the Community
The existence of expressly or implied external competences of the Community
does not mean that the Community competences are exclusive.107  As stated
above the most common arrangement is some kind of a mixed agreement where
both the Community and the MS have the competences to conclude an
agreement.
The question of exclusivity depends on whether a transfer of powers to the
Community flows from the Treaty or its application.  Thus the exclusive character
of the external competences of the Community, which is expressly conferred by
the Treaty in the field of the common commercial policy108 has been confirmed by
the Court.109
Implied external competences can also have and exclusive character if
competence has been transferred to the Community in the internal sphere.  As
stated, a Treaty provision can confer exclusive competences with effect from a
particular time and thereby also for the hallmark of exclusivity for external powers
derived from them.  The exercise of internal competences, as discussed in
Chapter 3.2.1 can also lead to the exclusivity of the implied external competence
linked to it.
In Opinion 2/91 ILO110 the Court held that there is no question of complete
cession of competence to the Community, whether internal or external, if internal
Community competence is exercised through the adoption of provisions laying
down minimum requirements.111 This is the case in the fields of social policy;112
consumer protection,113 and environmental protection,114 and in practice is quite
often the case in harmonization of laws in the technical field.115
Opinion 2/91 did however confirm that the so-called ERTA doctrine116 is
not limited to Community rules in the framework of common policies, such as
                                                
107 See Kapteyn, P.J.G., VerLoren, P. van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European
Communities, 3rd ed., Kluwer Law International, [1998], p. 1259.
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116 See detailed discussion on the case (ERTA Case) in chapter 3.2.1.
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transport policy.117  What matters is whether the intensity of the arrangement,
whatever its denomination, is such as to involve a cession of national powers in
favour of Community competence in the field of application of the rules
concerned.118  The Court also made clear, that exclusivity cannot be based: i) on
any difficulties that may arise for the legislative function of the Community should
the MS retain concurrent competence in an area where the Community has
adopted minimum requirements; and ii) on Community measures adopted under
Article 94 EC.119
It must also be addressed that according to the Kramer cases the mere
existence of implied competence does not, or so it appears, lead to exclusivity as
long as and in so far as no transfer of powers in the internal sphere has yet taken
place by or by virtue of the Treaty.120 Except where internal powers can only be
effectively exercised at the same time as external powers, internal competence
may give rise to external competence only if it is exercised.121
The fact that the MS have to implement or amend their legislation does not
affect the exclusive competence of the Community, and the Community remains
competent to act in the international level.122
3.3.2 Mixed agreements
The complex nature of the EU and the Communities as actors on the international
arena can be illustrated by the notion of mixed agreement.  That is an agreement,
which includes among their Contracting Parties not only one or more of the
European Communities but also one or more of their MS.123
This complexity is further illustrated by the fact that we are faced not only
with the Communities and the notion of three pillars, but also with a blend of
intergovernmental cooperation, functional integration, supranational powers and
federalist aspirations.  Third States will be faced with a confusing menu of
competences and actors.124
                                                
117 See Emiliou, Nicholas, Towards a clearer demarcation line? The division of external
relations power between the Community and Member States, European Law Review, Vol.
19, February, Sweet & Maxwell, [1994], p. 84-86.
118 Kapteyn, P.J.G., VerLoren, P. van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European
Communities, 3rd ed., Kluwer Law International, [1998], p. 1260.
119 Emiliou, Nicholas, Towards a clearer demarcation line? The division of external
relations power between the Community and Member States, European Law Review, Vol.
19, February, Sweet & Maxwell, [1994], p. 85.
120 Kapteyn, P.J.G., VerLoren, P. van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European
Communities, 3rd ed., Kluwer Law International, [1998], p. 126, where they cite to Cases 3,4,
and 76 Kramer et al (1976) ECR at 1309.
121Kapteyn, P.J.G., VerLoren, P. van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European
Communities, 3rd ed., Kluwer Law International, [1998], 1261.
122 Opinon 2/91 (1993) ECR I-1061 at 1082.
123 Rosas, Allan, Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements, International Law Aspects of the
European Union, in Koskenniemi, M., (ed.), International Law Aspects of the European
Union, Kluwer Law International, [1998], p.125.
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Allan Rosas divides the notion of mixed agreements into a few types of
agreements, which all have their distinctive characteristics. 125 I will base my
discussion on mixed agreement on his categorization of the various types.
3.3.2.1 Different types of mixed agreements
There is a basic division between mixed agreements prescribing parallel
competence of the Communities and MS, on one hand, and shared competence,
on the other hand.
A parallel competence can be described as when the Community may
adhere to an agreement, with full rights and obligations as any other Contracting
Party, having no direct effect on the rights and obligations for MS being parties to
the same treaty.126  Shared competence on the other hand implies that there is
some division between the obligations and rights contained in the agreement
between the Community and the MS.127 By following Dolmans,128 one can
distinguish between mixed agreements with "coexistent" competence and mixed
agreements with "concurrent competence".
The former is the case when an agreement contains provisions, which fall
under the exclusive competence of the Community and/or the MS, and it is
possible to identify separate parts which either the Community or the MS are
responsible for.  The latter type is when the agreement in question forms a certain
whole, which cannot be separated into two parts.129
It is also possible to distinguish between facultative and obligatory mixity.
The mixed agreement is facultative when the competence of the Community is
non-exclusive and there are no competences reserved for MS.  If the MS has
some competences then it is an obligatory mixity.
Finally one can divide between mixed agreement of bilateral and multilateral
character.  An example of bilateral agreement is an agreement between the
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Community and the MS on the one hand, and a third country on the other hand.
A multilateral agreement would be one involving parallel competences between
the Community and the MS, meaning that the Community's adherence would not,
in principle, be different from the separate participation of some or all of the MS.
3.3.2.2 Mixed agreements - legal and practical problems
Rosas divides the legal and practical problems relating to mixed agreements into
two separate parts.  The former concerns the problems relating to the very
existence and scope of the agreements rights and obligations.  The latter part
concerns the problem relating to the application and interpretation of the rights
and obligations. 130
Concerning the existence and the scope of the agreement it can cause
problems when the conclusion by the Community and the MS, of a mixed
agreement, must go hand in hand.  Usually the Council has decided that the
Community conclusion comes only after all the MS have ratified the agreement in
question.131 This requirement can cause problems for it can take many years
before all the MS ratify a signed agreement.
The termination or a suspension of a mixed agreement can also cause
problems.  If a part of the agreement, which is only of a concern to the
Community, is suspended, then the Council can take that decision independently
and without separate decision by the MS.132 The situation is more complex if the
suspension affects the whole agreement, also the part of it which is under the
competence of the MS.
As stated above the application and implementation of mixed agreements can
cause some problems.  Since it is very difficult to determine where legal powers
lie between the Community and the MS, the most convenient conclusion for the
third party is that the Community and the MS assume joint obligations and that
they are required to assure these joint obligations.133  The external representation
and uncertainty of who is responsible for the day-to-day management of an
agreement have though occasionally arisen.  An example of this is the problem
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encountered in the FAO, to which the Community is a member, as illustrated by
the controversy over the right to vote in the FAO Conference on the adoption of
an Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas.134
The problems facing mixed agreement are no private internal matter of the
Community for it affects the third parties, which are contracting parties.135  It is
therefore obvious that with respect to the interests of third parties, the question
arises as to the extent of the whether the Community is responsible for the
implementation of the whole agreement.  This again touches upon the
categorisation of mixed agreement outlined in Chapter 3.3.2.1 for the situation
varies whether the mixed agreement consists of parallel competences or shared
competences.  In the case of the former each party alone bears the responsibility
for the fulfilment of the entire agreement.  If the latter applies the situation is more
complex.136
If competences are coexistent, the each party, Community or MS, bears its
own responsibility and may escape responsibility for breaches outside of the
scope of its competence, on the condition that the third party is aware of the lack
of competence.137 If the competences are concurrent then the Community and the
MS are jointly responsible for the implementation of the whole agreement.138
Mixed agreements also invite the question as to the responsibility of MS
towards each other for the fulfilment of the agreement.  In the case of parallel
competences, it is clear that such responsibility exists.  If competences are shared,
and especially in the case of a predominantly bilateral agreement involving
concurrent competences, it is doubtful whether MS, are under public international
law, responsible inter se.139
The method of national implementation of a mixed agreement can produce
some problems.140  Some of the EU countries base upon a dualist system in
respect of the status of international agreements in relation to domestic legislation.
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The dualist approach is based on the idea that the domestic legislation and the
international acts are two separate sets of acts and special measures are needed
on behalf of the legislator to make the international act binding according to
domestic legislation.141  Additionally there may be concerns regarding
constitutional problems if the agreement involves transfer of national competences
to an international body.142  Finally, when the distribution of competences is not
clear for third states, they may send claims to both Community and MS.
Disagreement between Community and MS on division of powers should also
result in joint and several liability.143
In addition to the aforementioned there are problems concerning the judicial
control of mixed agreements.  In Chapter 4.3 I address the judicial control of the
WTO Agreement, which is as discussed a mixed agreement.
3.4 Community exclusive competences in the
field of common commercial policy
3.4.1 Common commercial policy
In Article 3 EC it is stated that for the purposes set out in Article 2 EC, the
activities of the Community shall include, as provided in the Treaty and in
accordance with the timetable set therein a common commercial policy.144  The
common commercial policy is discussed in Article 131-134 under Title IX of the
EC Treaty.
The common commercial policy is not defined in the Treaty145 but the main
elements are outlined in Article 133 EC where it is stated that it shall be based on
uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion
of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of
liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those taken in
the event of dumping or subsidies.  The enumeration in Article 133 EC of subjects
covered by the common commercial policy is a non-exhaustive enumeration.146
It has been stated that no definition of the concept "common commercial
policy" was needed for it is not a term of Community law, but instead it refers to
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international law, similar to the concept of "custom union" in Article 23 of the EC
Treaty, which the full definition it to be found in Article XXIV:8 GATT. 147
It is an inevitable consequence of the internal market that the MS need a
common commercial policy in relation to third countries.148  As a result of the
internal market goods from third countries are in a free flow as soon as they have
been lawfully imported into one of the MS.  If the conditions, such as custom
duties, where lower in one MS, there would be a tendency to import goods from
third countries, into the Community through the MS with the lowest barrier, and
distribute the goods from there.  This would upset the competitiveness of other
MS.
The common commercial policy covers both the relationship between the
MS and also exports to third countries.149  In Article 131(1) EC it is stated that
by establishing a customs union between themselves MS aim to contribute, in the
common interest, to the harmonious development of worlds trade, the progressive
abolition of restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs
barriers.  It is therefore clear that the aim of the common commercial policy
extends further than simply to the Community markets.150
Article 132(1) EC relates to third countries by stating that without prejudice
to obligations undertake by the MS within the framework of international
organisations, MS shall progressively harmonise the systems whereby they grant
aid for exports to third countries, to the extent necessary to ensure that
competition between undertakings of the Community is not distorted.  It is
important to harmonise the export aid for if they were not harmonised there would
not be a competitive balance between the MS and the competitiveness would be
determined by the aid but not by quality and the real price of the product.
According to Article 132(2) EC the Council shall, acting by a qualified
majority, on a proposal from the Commission, issue any directives needed for the
application of the common commercial policy and pursuant to Article 133(4) EC
the Council shall act by a qualified majority.
It is important to define the common commercial policy and whether a
subject is covered by it for the Community has exclusive competences in all fields
falling under it.151  As outlined exclusive competences of the Community mean
that the MS cannot engage in any activities or acted out any measures.  The
principle of subsidiary is for example inapplicable when the subject falls under
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exclusive competences of the Communities.  I will discuss further the effects of the
common commercial policy in Chapter 3.4.
In Opinion 1/78 the Court dealt with the scope of the common commercial
policy in connection with international agreement on rubber.  The Court stated
that Article 133 EC could not be interpreted so as "to restrict the common
commercial policy to the use of instruments intended to have an effect only on the
traditional aspects of external trade to the exclusion of more highly developed
mechanisms such as appear in the agreement envisaged.  A common policy
understood in the sense would be destined to become nugatory in the course of
time."152  Then the Court continued by stating that "[a] restrictive interpretation of
the concept of 'common commercial policy' would risk causing disturbances in
intra-community trade by reasons of the disparities which would then exist n
certain sectors of economic relations with non-member countries."153
In the light of the above mentioned many argued that the new agreements
introduced by the Uruguay Round should fall under the scope of the common
commercial policy for it was to be interpret as extending to other modes of trade
than the traditional one and certainly to follow the international trends.154
3.4.2 Common commercial policy and GATT 1947
According to Article 307 EC the rights and obligations arising from agreements
concluded before 1 January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their
accession, between one or more MS on the on hand, and one or more third
countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaty.  The
GATT, which was concluded in 1947, is one of the most important international
agreements covered by this provision.
In the International Fruit Company case155 the Court confirmed that the
Community was bound by the provisions of GATT 1947 by stating that "in so far
as under the EEC Treaty the Community has assumed the powers previously
exercised by the MS in the area covered by the General Agreement". 156
According to the ruling the binding effect upon the Community was not the result
of Article 307 EC, but the result of the take over of the Community as a party to
the Agreement, instead of the MS.157
As outlined in Chapter 2 the GATT 1947 was transformed into the World
Trade Organisation as a result of the Uruguay Round.  The GATT 1994 and
connected Agreements are today annexed to the WTO Agreement under Annex
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1A, alongside the GATS158 and TRIPS.159  The Community and MS
competences concerning the two latter ones are mixed and they will participate
together in the activities of the WTO, even though in practise the Commission will
usually act as their representative.160
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4 Competences of the
European Community in
relation to the WTO
4.1 Introduction
As stated above the Court confirmed, in 1971 that the GATT 1947 fell under the
exclusive competences of the Community.  After the Uruguay Round the WTO
Agreement emerged and now the GATT was an annex to that Agreement along
with two new agreement concerning services, GATS and intellectual property, the
TRIPS.Agreement.
There were conflicting opinions on the competences of the Community to
conclude these Agreements, and to what extent the Agreements fell under the MS
competences.  To eliminate these uncertainty the Commission asked the Court
with reference to Article 300(6) EC (ex Article 228(6)) to clarify the matter.
It can be said, that the conclusion, even though it was clear in itself, was all
but clear in reality, for it defined the most parts of the GATS and almost all of the
TRIPS Agreement under shared competences of the Community, on one hand,
and the MS, on the other.  Therefore these two annexes to the WTO Agreement
can be described as mixed agreements, but as has been discussed mixed
agreements can be extremely troublesome in implementation.
4.2 Opinion 1/94 on the WTO
In spite of the signing of the WTO Agreement the division of competences
between the Community and the MS to conclude the Agreement remained
unresolved.161
The Commission's opinion was that the WTO Agreement and the Final Act
fell within the exclusive competences of the Community.162  The Commission
based its opinion on the case law concerning the wide scope of competences and
treaty making powers regarding the common commercial policy.  The
Commission also referred to the fact that the WTO Agreement and its annexes
were considered to be a "single package" and therefore the competences should
not be divided.  It also pointed out the expansion of GATT into other fields, that
is trade in services and intellectual property rights, and that it was justified by
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development in international economy. In addition it argued that the creation and
smooth operation of the Single European market called for a comprehensive
common commercial policy.163
Following the signing of the Agreement the Commission, submitted a request
to the Court,164 requesting for an Opinion, pursuant to Article 300(6) EC. The
questions submitted to the Court, by the Commission were the following:165
"(1) Does the European Community have the competence to conclude all
parts of the Agreement establishing the WTO concerning trade in Services
(GATS) and the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights including
trade in counterfeit goods (TRIPs) on the basis of the EC Treaty, more
particularly on the basis of Article [133] EC alone, or in combination with Article
[95] EC and/or Article [308] EC?
(2) Does the European Community have the competence to conclude alone
also those parts of the WTO Agreement which concern products and/or services
falling exclusively within the scope of application of the ESCS and the EAEC
Treaties?
(3)  If the answer to the above two questions is in the affirmative, does this
affect the ability of MS to conclude the WTO Agreement, in the light of the
agreement already reached that they will be original Members of the WTO?"166
The subject of the above mentioned questions are basically two folded.
Firstly, the Court is requested to ascertain whether or not the Community had
exclusive competence to conclude the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in
Goods, in so far as those Agreements concern ECSC products and Euratom
Products.  Secondly, whether the Community had exclusive competences to
conclude the GATS and the TRIPS.
4.2.1 Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods167
In its Opinion the Court states that the Commission and the parties who have
submitted observations agree that the Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
are for the most part covered by the exclusive competence conferred on the
Community in matters concerning the common commercial policy by Article 133
EC.168  No claim was though brought that the Agreement should also apply to
Euratom products.
According to Article 305(2) EC the provisions of the Treaty shall not
derogate from those of the Eurotom Treaty.  Therefore the Court concluded that
since the Euratom Treaty contained no provisions relating to external trade, there
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was nothing to prevent agreements concluded pursuant to Article 133 EC from
extending to international trade in Euratom products.169
Concerning the ECSE Treaty the Court stated that the Community has sole
competence pursuant to Article 133 EC to conclude an external agreement of a
general nature, that is to say, encompassing all types of goods, even where those
goods include ECSC products.170  Then the Court cited Opinion 1/75171 and said
that the ECSC Treaty cannot "render inoperative Articles [133] and [134] of the
EEC Treaty and affect the vesting of power in the Community for the negotiation
and conclusion of international agreements in the realm of common commercial
policy".172  Then the Court said:  "In the present case, it appears from an
examination of the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods that none of them
relates specifically to ECSC products.  It follows that the exclusive competence
of the Community to conclude those agreements cannot be impugned on the
ground that they also apply to ECSC products."173
The Council maintained that Article 37 EC, on the common agricultural
policy was the right basis for its decision to conclude the WTO Agreement and its
annexes in respect of the Agreement on Agriculture.174  The Court did not accept
that and stated that the fact that the commitments entered into under the
Agreement on Agriculture annexed to the WTO Agreement required "internal
measures to be adopted on the basis of Article [37] of the EC Treaty does not
prevent the international commitments themselves from being entered into
pursuant to Article [133] EC alone."175
The same arguments were put forward concerning the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures176 and the Court also
rejected that claim by stating that the agreement could be concluded on the basis
of Article 133 EC alone for the agreement was confined in its preamble to
measures aimed at minimizing negative effects on trade.177
It must also be addressed that the Court ruled that the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade,178 falls within the ambit of the common commercial
policy for it is designed merely to ensure that technical regulations and standards
do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade. 179
In accordance with the aforementioned the Court, in paragraph 34 of the
Opinion, concluded that the Community, following the above-mentioned
arguments, has "exclusive competence, pursuant to Article [133] of the EC
Treaty, to conclude the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods."
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4.2.2 Common commercial policy and GATS and TRIPS
The Commission's main contention was that the conclusion of both GATS and
TRIPS fell within the exclusive competence conferred on the Community by
Article 133 EC.  The Council, MS and the Parliament vigorously disputed that
reasoning.
4.2.2.1 GATS
The MS have always, as discussed, interpreted the concept of common
commercial policy in a narrow way.  The Court, in the other hand, stated that the
common commercial policy must be interpret as having a vide scope and stated
that services cannot immediately, and as a matter of principle, be excluded from
the scope of Article 133 EC.180 Nevertheless the Court did not come to the
conclusion that that all of the GATS fell under the scope of the common
commercial policy.
The Court referred to Article I(2) of GATS, where trade in services is
defined.  The Article distinguished between four modes of supply of services.181
The Court ruled in its Opinion that only one of the four modes of supply of
services, fell within the concept of common commercial policy.
The Court argued that cross-frontier supplies does not involve any movement
of persons, and that it does not require the supplier to move to the consumer's
country, nor, the consumer to move to the supplier's country. In that case the
situation is therefore, not unlike trade in goods, which is unquestionably covered
by the common commercial policy.  Therefore there is "no particular reason why
such a supply should not fall within the concept of the common commercial
policy."182
The Court concluded by stating that the other modes of supply of service
referred to by GATS as "consumption abroad", "commercial presence" and the
"presence of natural persons," were not covered by the common commercial
policy. 183
Regarding particular services comprised in transport the court referred firstly,
to the fact that transport it covered by a different title184 in the Treaty than
common commercial policy.185  Secondly the Court refereed to the ERTA case,
where the Court for the fist time acknowledged the doctrine of implied powers,
by stating that the underlying reason for that ruling of the Court was that
international agreements in transport matters are not covered by Article 133
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EC.186  In other words, because international agreements in transport were not
covered by common commercial policy the Court in the ERTA case187 came up
with the doctrine of implied powers.
The Commission argued that one must divide between agreements dealing
with safety rules, as in the ERTA case, and commercial agreements. The Court
rejected that argument and stated that ERTA case draws no such distinction.  The
Court also stated that the Court had confirmed that analysis in Opinion 1/76188
concerning an agreement indented to rationalize the economic situation in the
inland waterways sector, where the Court was dealing with an economic
agreement, not connected to safety rules as in the ERTA case.189
The Commission in support of its view that transport service should be
covered by the common commercial policy referred to series of embargoes which
were based on Article 133 EC, which involved the suspension of transport
services.  That showed that the Community had dealt with transport matters under
common commercial policy.
Firstly, the Court rejected that argumentation and stated that the embargoes
had been aimed primarily to the export and import of goods, but the suspension
of transport service was a necessary means to that principal objective.
Accordingly the Court stated that the suspension was to be seen as "a necessary
adjunct to the principal measure".190
Secondly, the Court rejected that argument saying that a "mere practise of
the Council cannot derogate form the rules laid down in the Treaty and cannot,
therefore, create a precedent binding on Community institutions with regard to the
correct legal basis."191
Following this the Court stated that only cross-frontier supplies are covered
by the common commercial policy according to Article 133 of the EC Treaty.192
4.2.2.2 TRIPS
The Court noted that the part of TRIPS, which concerns the means of
enforcement of intellectual property rights, contains specific rules as to measures
to be applied at border crossing points.  These stipulations have its counterpart in
the provisions of Council Regulation laying down measures to prohibit the release
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for free circulation of counterfeit goods.193  Following the Court stated:
"Inasmuch as that regulation concerns the prohibition of the release into free
circulation of counterfeit goods, it was rightly based on Article [133] of the EC
Treaty: it relates to measures to be taken by the customs authorities at the external
frontiers of the Community.  Since measures of that type can be adopted
autonomously by the Community institutions on the basis of Article [133] of the
EC Treaty, it is for the Community alone to conclude international agreements on
such matters."194
Concerning the TRIPs Agreement the Court recognised that there is a
connection between intellectual property rules and trade in goods.195  Those
connections are though not enough to bring them within the scope of Article 133
EC.  The Court also pointed out that, intellectual property rights do not relate only
to international trade.  They affected to an equal extent, to say the least, domestic
trade.196
The Court also confirmed that the Community is competent, in the field of
intellectual property, to harmonise national laws pursuant to Article 94 and 95 EC
and may use Article 308 EC as a basis.197  The Court however pointed out that
under those Articles certain voting rules apply (rules of procedure) and they are
not identical to those under Article 133 EC.  Then the Court concluded by stating
that if the Community were to be recognized as having exclusive competence to
enter into agreements with non-member countries to harmonize the protection of
intellectual property and, at the same time, to achieve harmonization at
Community level, the Community institutions would be able to escape the internal
constraints to which they are subject in relation to procedures and to rules as to
voting.198  Then the Court stated that "institutional practice in relation to
autonomous measures or external agreements adopted on the basis of Article
[133] EC cannot alter this conclusion."199
The Court adopted a similar approach with regard to the application of the
so-called new commercial policy instruments, adopted under Article 133 EC.200
Such measures, even though they have ancillary provisions for the organization of
purely consultative procedures or clauses calling on the other party to raise the
level of protection of intellectual property does not mean that the Community has
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exclusive competence to conclude an international agreement of the type and
scope of TRIPS.201
The Court, with reference to the foregoing, concluded that apart from those
of its provisions, which concern the prohibition of the release into free circulation
of counterfeit goods, TRIPS does not fall within the scope of the common
commercial policy.202
4.2.3 Implied external powers
As discussed, the Court, in its first major judgement on the matter in the ERTA
case accepted the existence of implied external powers but found them to be co-
extensive with its internal powers.203 The activities, which fall under the
Community internal powers, according to Article 3 of the EC Treaty are
expanding, and numerous new activities have been included in the last two
decades.
In addition the Court stated in its ruling in the ERTA case that each time the
Community, with a view to implementing a common policy envisaged by the
Treaty, adopts common rules, whatever form theses may take: "the MS no longer
have the right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations
with third countries which affect those rules.  As and when such common rules
come into being the Community alone is in a position to assume and carry out
contractual obligations affecting the whole sphere of application of the Community
legal system."204
As stated, the Court, in Opinion 1/76, ruled that the external competence is
not dependent on the actual adoption of internal measures.205 Therefore the
Community appears to enjoy exclusive external competences even though internal
measures in a specific area have not been enacted, provided that and in so far as
"the participation of the Community in the international agreement is ... necessary
for the attainment of one of the objectives of the Community."206
As outlined in Chapter 4.2 the Commission submitted three questions to the
Court.  The Commission asked, in question number one, whether the European
Community had the competence to conclude all parts of the Agreement
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establishing the WTO concerning GATS and TRIPS, on the basis of Article 133
EC, or in combination with Article 95 EC and/or Article 308 EC?
The latter segment of the question related to the opinion of the Commission
that if the Court would come to the conclusion that the Community did not have
adequate power on the basis of specific provisions of the Treaty or legislative acts
of the institutions, it had exclusive competence by virtue of the above mentioned
Articles.
In Chapter 3.2 I discuss in general the implied external competences of the
Community.  The discussions in this Chapter are from the perspective of the
Opinion and how one can interpret the views expressed by they Court in the
Opinion.
4.2.3.1 GATS
The Commission referred to three types of sources for the exclusive competences
of the Community regarding GATS.207  Firstly, the powers conferred on the
Community institutions by the Treaty at internal level, and that the external
competence flows from those internal powers.208  Secondly, the need to conclude
the agreement in order to achieve a Community objective.209 And finally, it
referred to Articles 95 EC and 308 EC.
The Court rejected the first argument that the source for the Communities
external competences to conclude the GATS flowed from its internal
competences.
Firstly, the Commission argued that were no specific provision in GATS,
which were not reflected by corresponding powers by the Community to adopt
measures at internal level.  According to the Commission, those powers are set
out in the chapters on the right of establishment, freedom to provide service and
transport.210
The Court referred to the ERTA case where it had stated that "the powers of
the Community extended to relationship arising from international law, and hence
involved the need in the sphere in question for agreements with the third countries
concerned."211  The Court then stated that in the ERTA case212 the Court ruled
that whether the MS are acting individually or collectively they only lose their right
to assume obligations with non-member countries as and when common rules
which could be affected by those obligations come into being.  Then the Court
concluded by stating than "[o]nly in so far as common rules have been established
at internal level does the external competence of the Community become
exclusive.  However, not all transport matters are already covered by common
rules."213
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Secondly, the Court dismissed the arguments put forward by the
Commission that the MS capabilities to conclude and conduct and external policy
based on bilateral agreements with non-member countries would inevitably leads
to distortions in the flow of service and will progressively undermine the internal
market.214 The Court pointed out the nothing in the Treaty prevents concerted
action in relation to non-member countries.215
Thirdly, the Court stated that the sole objective of the chapters on the right of
establishment, freedom to provide service and transport, were to secure the right
of establishment and freedom to provide services for nationals of MS.  Therefore
the Court concluded that one cannot "infer from those chapters that the
Community has exclusive competence to conclude an agreement with non-
member countries to liberalize first establishment and access to service markets,
other than those which are the subjects of cross-border supplies within the
meaning of GATS, which are covered by Article 133."216
Concerning the second argument put forward as a source for exclusive
competence of the Community, the need to conclude the agreement in order to
achieve a Community objective, the Court referred to Opinion 1/76.  In the
Opinion it was stated that the Community's exclusive external competences are
not confined to cases in which use has already been made of internal powers to
adopt measures for the attainment of common policies.217
The Commission based on the argument the there were both internal and
external reasons to justify exclusive competences of the Community.218
Concerning the internal reasons, the Commission stated that without such
participation the homogeneity and harmonization of the internal market would be
impaired.  Concerning external reasons, which were political, the Commission
stated that the Community could not allow itself to remain inactive on the
international stage.
The Court did not accept those arguments and reasoned that the issue in
question in Opinion 1/76 was different.  The Court then discussed the case and
stated that it was understandable that the external powers were exercised and
thus become exclusive, without any internal legislation having first being adopted
for the intention was to achieve the objective of establishing autonomous common
rules, and such an objective were not possible to achieve without the participation
of Switzerland.219
Then the Court stated that this is not the situation in the sphere of services
and that the "attainment of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide
services for nationals of the MS is not inextricably linked to the treatment to be
afforded in the Community to nationals of non-member countries or in non-
member countries to nationals of MS of the Community."220
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Thirdly, as an argument for the third possible source of Community exclusive
competences, the Commission referred to Articles 95 EC and 308 EC.
Regarding Article 95 EC the Court stated that an internal power to
harmonize, which has not been exercised, cannot confer exclusive external
competence on the Community.  On the other hand it concluded that it is
undeniable that, where harmonizing powers have been exercised, the
harmonization measures thus adopted may limit, or even remove, the freedom of
the MS to negotiate with non-member countries.221
Concerning Article 308 EC the Court stated that it enables the Community,
"to cope with any insufficiency in the powers conferred on it, expressly or by
implication, for the achievement of its objectives, cannot in itself vest exclusive
competence in the Community at international level".  The Court also discussed
Opinion 1/76 and stated that where internal powers can only be effectively
exercised at the same time as external powers, internal competence can give rise
to exclusive external competence only if it is exercised, and that applied a fortiori
to Article 308 EC.222
Finally, the court concluded by stating that whenever the Community has
included in its internal legislative acts provisions relating to the treatment of
nationals of non-member counties or expressly conferred on its institutions
powers to negotiate with non-member countries, or in the case of an absence of
any express provision authorizing its institutions to negotiate with non-member
countries, where the Community has achieved complete harmonization of the
rules, it acquires exclusive external competences.
To confirm this the Court referred to the ERTA case where it was stated that
the common rules in question could be affected if the MS retain freedom to
negotiate with non-member countries.223
The Court accepted that the Community had achieved complete
harmonization of the rules governing access to a self-employed activity, and based
on that fact the MS were deprived of the freedom to negotiate with non-member
countries, but that is not the case in all service sectors.
Following the Court concluded that the competence to conclude GATS
Agreement is shared between the Community and the MS.
4.2.3.2 TRIPS
The Commission, in its argumentation for its exclusive competence of the
Community to conclude the TRIPS Agreement, referred to similar arguments as
for the excusive competence to conclude the GATS.  Firstly, the Commission
referred to the existence of legislative acts of the institutions, which could be
affected within the meaning of the ERTA case if MS were to participate in its
conclusion.  Secondly, the need for the Community to participate in the agreement
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in order to achieve one of the objectives set out in the Treaty.224 Finally the
Commission referred to Article 95 EC and 308 EC.
The Court stated that the reference to Opinion 1/76 was just as disputable in
the case of the TRIPS Agreement as in the case of GATS for the unification or
harmonization of intellectual property rights in the Community context does no
necessarily have to be accompanied by agreements with non-member countries in
order to be effective.  And moreover the Court stated that Article 95 EC and 308
EC "cannot in themselves confer exclusive competence on the Community."225
Concerning the reference to the ERTA case the Court, argued that the
harmonisation achieved within the Community in certain areas covered by the
TRIPS Agreement is only partial and that, in other areas, no harmonisation has
been envisaged.  Then the Court pointed out that the Community is competent to
harmonize national rules in accordance with Article 95 EC, in so far as, the rules
"directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market".226
Despite the aforementioned the Court concluded by stating that the fact remains
that the Community institutions have not exercised their powers in the field of the
enforcement of intellectual property rights, except by laying down measures to
prohibit the release for free circulation of counterfeit goods. 227 By this
argumentation the Court confirmed earlier rulings that if the Community does not
exercise its internal competences it cannot claim exclusive external competences,
except if certain condition are fulfilled which was not the case here.228
The Court then concluded by stating that the Community and its MS are
jointly competent to conclude the TRIPS Agreement.229
4.2.3.3 Summary
Regarding GATS the Court came to the same conclusion as in the ERTA case
that the MS loose their right to take on international obligations with non-member
countries as and when common rules come into effect, which could be affected by
international obligations.230 The Court accepted also that the Community might
use powers conferred on it under the Treaty provisions on the right of
establishment and the freedom to provide services, in order to lay down internal
rules, concerning nationals of non-member countries.231
                                                
224 This argumentation is based on Opinion 1/76.
225 Opinion 1/94 para. 101.
226 Opinion 1/94 para. 104.
227 Opinion 1/94, para. 105.
228 See Emiliou, Nicholas, The Death of Exclusive Competence? European Law Review, Vol.
21, No 4, August, Sweet & Maxwell, [1996], p. 307, where he says that internal competences
ay only give rise to exclusive treaty-making powers when: 1) they have been exercised; or 2)
whenever legislative provisions have been laid down; 3) whenever they confer express
powers to the Community institutions to negotiate with third countries.
229 Opinion 1/94, para. 105.
230 Opinion 1/94, para. 77.
231 Emiliou, Nicholas, The Death of Exclusive Competence? European Law Review, Vol. 21,
No 4, August, Sweet & Maxwell, [1996], p. 306.
43
The Court therefore concluded that the Community would acquire exclusive
external powers whenever it included in internal legislative acts provisions relating
to the treatment of nationals of non-member countries or expressly conferred on
its institutions powers to negotiate with non-member countries or again where the
Community had achieved complete harmonization of the rules governing access to
a self-employed activity.  As harmonization was not yet complete in all these
fields, the Court held that the power to conclude the GATS was shared between
the Community and the MS.232
Concerning the TRIPS Agreement the Court came to the conclusion that the
Community and its MS were jointly competence to conclude the agreement for
the Community had not exercised its powers to harmonize national rules in the
field of the enforcement of intellectual property rights, except in the field of
counterfeit goods, which fell within the scope of the common commercial
policy.233  External competences of the Community in the field of intellectual
property rights, other than those falling within the scope of Article 133 EC, are
depended upon the extent of internal harmonization.234
In effect the Court reached the following conclusion:235
a) Exclusive implied treaty-making powers for the Community do not flow
automatically from EC Treaty powers to lay down rules at internal level such as
for example Articles 95 EC and 308 EC.236
b) Exclusive Community treaty-making powers under Opinion 1/76 can be
claimed only in cases where envisaged internal Community legislation cannot
function effectively unless a third country is brought into the scheme envisaged by
means of an international agreement.237  The Community must therefore
demonstrate that the exercise of an attributed internal power is "inextricably
linked" to the exercise of implied treaty making powers at the same time.238
c) Only when internal Community rules have achieved complete
harmonization, an implied exclusive treaty-making power has to be recognized in
order to avoid such common rules being affected, within the meaning of the ERTA
case, if the MS retained freedom to negotiate with third countries.239
According to the aforementioned exclusivity based on implied powers was
ruled out by the Court.  The Community may though acquire exclusive implied
powers, if common rules have been adopted as a result of the exercise of express
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internal powers.  Accordingly internal competences may only give rise to
exclusive treaty-making powers when:240
a) They have to be exercised;241 b) or whenever legislative provisions have
been laid down, which for example in the field of treatment of third country
nationals;242 c) or whenever they confer express powers to the Community
institutions to negotiate with third counties.243
4.2.4 Duty of Co-Operation
At the hearing of the case the Commission draw the attention of the Court to the
fact that most likely problems would arise concerning the administration and
management of the WTO Agreement, and the Agreements covered by it, if the
Community and the MS were to share competences in relation to the GATS and
TRIPS.
Firstly, the Court responded, by stating that problems may arise concerning
the administration of the Agreements and the coordination necessary to ensure
unity in Communities and the MS actions.  These potential problems cannot,
however, modify the answer to the question of competence, that being a prior
issue.244
Secondly, the Court stated that it is vital to "ensure close cooperation in the
process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the commitments
entered into.  That obligation to cooperate flows from the requirement of unity in
the international representation of the Community."245
The Court also emphasised on the importance of close cooperation in the
light of the cross-retaliation system provided for by the DSU, and that in the
absence of close co-operation the MS and the Community might be unable to
apply the measures provided by that system.
4.3 Opinion 1/94 - The Aftermath
4.3.1 The critique on the Opinion
The Opinion of the Court was badly criticised by many as a "missed
opportunity"246 to clarify the issues relating to the common commercial policy and
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worse, as some stated, the "former practise and case law have suffered a severe
setback.247
Pescatore cited George Friden, where he summed up the situation in the
following words:248  "It is particularly regrettable and illogical that at a time when
the multilateral trade system was accomplishing its most important advance since
1947, by merging into a coherent whole the rules relating to services and the rules
relating to goods, demonstrating thus the close link between both fields and
making clear the fact that one could not conceive at present international trade
law without taking account off the rules applicable to services, the Court made the
Community take a step in exactly the opposite direction."
The critics based its critique on many different arguments.  Many argued that
the Opinion was obviously inspired by political rather than legal considerations.249
The MS are not eager to give up their competences or sovereignty in the field of
external competences and therefore there was a pressure on the Court not to go
too far.  The moderate views taken by the Court are also, up to a point, in line of
the development that has occurred in the last decade that the role of the Court as
the prime impetus of European integration is decreasing.
As stated the WTO Agreement purposes a so-called "single package"
scheme.  That means that a party to the Agreement must take over all the
Agreement falling under Annex 1 that is the Multilateral Trade Agreements.250
Critics say that the Community does not fulfil this requirement for the Court has
only ruled that the Multilateral Trade agreement in goods, one of four modes of
trade in services and a small part of the TRIPS Agreement falls under its
competences.
Critics also point out the devastating consequences that the Opinion is likely
to have on the "unitary representation" of the Community interests.251  This
critique is made, in spite of the fact that the Court addressed the Commissions
argument concerning potential difficulties concerning the unitary in representation
and coordination necessary to ensure unity in Communities and the MS actions.
As stated above the Court, in its answer, referred to the requirement of unity in
the international representation of the Community.252
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Pescatore states that the Opinion of the Court has truly created a lot of
pressure on the MS.253 He considers this pressure to be three folded.  Firstly, a
MS can during the phase of internal concentration force the application of the
unanimity rule, in its capacity as a sovereign WTO signatory, and thus either block
the deliberation process or obtain some compensation.  Secondly, a MS may use
its capacity as a WTO Contracting Party to oppose the position of the
Community, during the phase of discussion at WTO level.  Thirdly, third states
can see an opportunity in coming between the MS or by seeking a connivance of
a MS, by offering or accepting some advantages for the MS in question.
Concerning the common commercial policy it is argued that the Court
exercised an inward-looking approach to the policy by not accepting the new
dimension of trade policy, as it appears in the WTO Agreement, inside of the
spare of common commercial policy.  As Pescatore states it "The mischief done
by Opinion 1/94 is to have split artificially the trade policy into a 'traditional'
compartment, imposed to the Community like a straightjacket, an extensible
concept for the use of MS."254
It has also been argued that the concept "common commercial policy" must
be viewed and interpreted in the light of international law for that is where it is
derived from.255 Therefore, some have stated that the Court made a mistake in
interpreting these new trends in international trade as falling, largely, outside the
scope of the concept, and therefore not covered by the exclusive competences of
the Community based on Article 133 EC.
In the next Chapter I will discuss important disputes that were brought under
the Court, and how the Court dealt with them.  I will also, to some extent, discuss
how the disputes and merits in the cases reflect the points of arguments discussed
above.
4.3.2 The competences of the Court to interpret the WTO
Agreement
In short, there are three forms of actions against the Community Institutions,
which may be of assistance in obtaining correction from the European Court of
Justice and the Court of First Instance.256
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Firstly, actions can be brought for annulment of Community acts under
Article 230 EC.257 That Article is the principal Treaty provision in which the
Community norms can be challenged.258 The Court has held in its judgements that
where it has been held that, just as the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC allows
individuals to bring an action for annulment against a measure of an institution not
addressed to them provided that the measure is of direct259 and individual260
concern to them, the third paragraph of Article 232 EC must be interpreted as
also entitling them to bring and action for failure to act against an institution which
they claim has failed to adopt a measure that would have concerned them in the
same way.
Secondly, actions under Article 232 EC in respect of failure to act. Even
though the Court will only declare that the Commission has failed to act, it gives
rise to immediate legal obligation to take necessary action required.
Thirdly, actions for damages under Articles 235 EC and 288 EC. Article
288 EC states that in the case of non-contractual liability, the Community shall, in
accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the MS, make
good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance
or their duties.  Article 235 EC confers the jurisdiction in such cases on the Court
and, while it does not state that this jurisdiction is exclusive, this is implied by
Article 240 EC.261
In addition national courts may refer questions to the Court under Article
234 EC for a preliminary ruling.  If questions are referred to the Court by the
national court for a preliminary ruling, the parties do not have to show that the
measure is of direct and individual concern to them.  Therefore preliminary rulings
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have been showed to be the most practical procedure for non-privileged parties
to bring a case for the Court.
It is also settled case law that international agreements concluded by the
Council on behalf of the community under Article 300 EC are covered by the
concept and the Court has therefore jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on its
interpretations and validity.262
Below I mainly discuss cases where the national court has referred legal
questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling or cases brought up by a privileged
applicant against a Community act.  The question concerning jurisdiction to
interpret provisions of international law, under those rules of procedure apply also
for other actions, brought up under other provisions of the Treaty.  I will discuss
the jurisdiction of the Court to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the
WTO Agreement and Agreements covered by it.  I will also address the rights
which the WTO Agreement confer to legal and natural persons and to what
extend the Agreement can be relied upon in national courts and in the Court.
4.3.2.1 Case law on the interpretation on the WTO Agreement
Mixed agreements have always played an important role in Community's external
relations.  The Court early on confirmed its jurisdiction to interpret trade
provisions of association agreements, which were within the Community's
competences.263
In the Demirel case264 where the Court came to the conclusions that the
provisions of an association agreement fell within the competences of the
Community under Article 310 EC and therefore the Court had jurisdiction to
interpret the provisions in question.  It has though been widely accepted that the
judgement leaves open the question on the Court's jurisdiction to interpret the part
of a mixed agreement falling under the competences of the MS.265
Heliskoski on the other hand points out that the Court did not consider that
the competence of the Community under Article 310 EC is not exclusive and that,
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consequently, the commitments concerning the free movements of workers may
well have bee concluded under MS powers.  Heliskoski is therefore on the
opinion the that a better view would be that the judgement leaves open the
question whether the Court may interpret provisions of a mixed agreement
concluded under MS powers, either because the commitments concerned go
beyond Community competences, or because it has been decided not to exercise
the powers of the Community.266
4.3.2.2 The Hermés case
In the Hermés case267 the Court was requested to interpret a provision of the
TRIPS Agreement.  This was also the first time the Court was requested to
interpret a mixed agreement, other than association agreements.268
The Court was requested to interpret the notion of "provisional measures" in
Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement in the context of proceedings concerning the
infringement of trademark rights.269
Concerning the question of jurisdiction the Court referred, firstly, to the fact
that the Final Act and the WTO Agreement, was signed by the Community and
its MS and during that time Regulation No 40/94270 had been in force for one
month.271
Secondly, the Court stated that under Article 50(1) of the TRIPS
Agreement, judicial authorities of the contracting parties are required to be
authorised to order "provisional measures" to protect the interests of proprietors
of trademark rights conferred under the laws of those parties.272 Then it pointed
out that according to Article 99 of Regulation No 40/94, rights arising from a
Community trademark may be safeguarded by the adoption of "provisional,
including protective measures."273
Thirdly, the Court stated that since the Community is a party to the TRIPS
Agreement and since that agreement applies to the Community trade mark the
courts referred to in Article 99 of Regulation No 40/94, when called upon to
apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional measures do so, as far as
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possible, in the light of the working and purpose of Article 50 of the TRIPS
Agreement.274
The Court, according to the aforementioned concluded that the Court has, in
any event, jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement.275
According to the Court, it was immaterial that the dispute in the main
proceedings concerned trade-marks whose international registrations designate
the Benelux:
First, it is solely for the national court hearing the dispute, which must assume
responsibility for the order to be made, to assess the need for a preliminary ruling
so as to enable it to give its judgment. Consequently, where the question referred
to it concerns a provision, which it has jurisdiction to interpret, the Court of
Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling.276
Second, where a provision can apply both to situations falling within the
scope of national law and to situations falling within the scope of Community law,
it is clearly in the Community interest that, in order to forestall future differences of
interpretation, that provision should be interpreted uniformly, whatever the
circumstances in which it is to apply.277  Then the Court continued by stating that
it had been pointed out,278 that Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement applies to
Community trade-marks as well as to national trade marks.279
 The Court therefore concluded it had jurisdiction to rule on the question
submitted by the national court.
Based on the ruling it can be assumed that the Court has jurisdiction to
interpret all provisions of the WTO Agreement and other mixed agreements,
which fall within the exclusive or non-exclusive competences of the Community.280
The above mentioned reasoning of the Court does not answer, on the other
hand, whether the Court has jurisdiction to interpret provisions of a mixed
agreement falling only under the competences of the MS, or whether the Court's
jurisdiction under Article 234 EC extends to provisions of Article 50 of the
TRIPS Agreement in cases other than those concerning provisional measures
aiming at the protection of trade-mark rights.281
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4.3.2.3 The Dior and Assco cases
In the Dior case282 the question of the interpretation of Article 50 of the TRIPS
Agreement was raised again, in a proceedings between the companies Parfums
Christian Dior SA and Tuk Consultancy BV.  The former was the owner of the
trademarks for perfumery products, and it offered its products in the European
Community through a selective distribution system.  In the proceedings before the
Dutch court, the company submitted that Tuk had infringed the Dior trade-marks
by selling perfumes bearing those marks, since the perfume had not been put on
the market in the European Economic Area by Dior or with its consent.  The
national court, considered that the main proceedings raised the issue of the direct
effect of Article 50(6) of the TRIPS Agreement and referred the following
question to the Court for a preliminary ruling:  "Is Article 50(6) of the TRIPS
Agreement to be interpreted as having direct effect in the sense that the legal
consequences set out therein take effect even in the absence of any corresponding
provision of national law?"283
The dispute in the Dior case, on the other hand related to the protection
enjoyed under the law of the Netherlands concerning wrongful acts, by a type of
scaffolding, designed and produced by Layher Germany but imported to the
Netherlands by Layher Netherlands.  Both companies applied to the District
Court for interim measures prohibiting the importing into the Netherlands, selling,
offering for sale or otherwise trading in another type of scaffolding system
manufactured in Germany by Assco Gerüste GmbH and marketed in the
Netherlands by Mr. Van Dijk, who traded under the name of Assco Holland
Stegers Plettac Nederlands (hereafter referred to as Assco)
The District Court granted the application and ruled that the period referred
to in Article 50(6) of the TRIPS Agreement was to be one year.  An appeal was
lodged to the Regional Court, which in substance upheld the interim decision.
Then Assco lodged an appeal for the Hoeg Raad der Nederlanden, which
decided to refer the following three questions to the Court for a preliminary
ruling:284 "(1) Does the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to interpret Article 50 of
the TRIPS Agreement also extend to the provisions of that article where they do
not concern provisional measures to prevent infringement of trade-mark rights?;
(2) Does Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement, in particular Article 50(6) have
direct effect?; (3) Where an action lies under national civil law against the copying
of an industrial design, on the basis of the general rules concerning wrongful acts,
an in particular those relating to unlawful competition, must the protection thus
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afforded to the holder of the right be regarded as and intellectual property right
within the meaning of Article 50(1) of the TRIPS Agreement?"
The Court summed up the questions submitted by the two national courts
into the following three points concerning respectively:285a) the jurisdiction of the
Court of Justice to interpret Article 50 of the TRIPS and the condition for
exercising that jurisdiction;286 b) whether Article 50(6) of TRIPS has direct
effect;287 and the interpretation of the term "intellectual property right."288
The Court recalled the Hermés case and repeated the key substance of it.  It
stated that in particular, the Court has jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of the
TRIPS Agreement in order to meet the needs of the courts of the MS when they
are called upon to apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional
measure for the protection of rights arising under Community legislation falling
within the scope of the TRIPS Agreement.289  Likewise, where a provision such
as Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement can apply both to situations falling within
the scope of national law and to situations falling within that of Community law, as
is the case in the field of trade marks, the Court has jurisdiction to interpret it in
order to forestall future differences of interpretation.290  That principle, which was
originally brought up by the Court in the Hermés case was, however, not based
on the close connection that existed between the situations concerning the
Community trademark and those concerning the national trademarks, but rather
on the nature of Article 50(6) of the TRIPS Agreement itself.291
The Court based its ruling on the fact that since Article 50 of the TRIPS
Agreement constitutes a procedural provision, which should be applied in the
same way in every situation falling within its scope and is capable of applying both
to situations covered by national law and to situations covered by Community
law, that obligation requires the judicial bodies of the MS and the Community, for
practical and legal reasons, to give it a uniform interpretation.292
The Court also addressed the obligation of close cooperation between the
MS and the Community institutions, in fulfilling the commitments undertaken by
them under joint competence and cited paragraph 108 of Opinion 1/94 that
regard.
 Then the Court stressed it opinion that only the Court of Justice acting in
cooperation with the courts and tribunals of the MS, pursuant to Article 234 EC,
is in position to ensure such uniform interpretation.
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The Advocate General based its opinion on the close link between he
situations concerning the Community trademark and those concerning the national
trademarks.293  The Court, on the other hand based its ruling on the nature of the
provision in question, the fact that Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement "constitutes
a procedural provision which should be applied in the same way in every situation
falling within its scope" and that where one and the same provision of a mixed
agreement applied to both areas of Community and MS competence, the Court
was thus entitled to rule on its interpretation, irrespective of whether the dispute in
the main proceedings concerned a matter within the competence of the MS.294
4.3.2.4 Summary
The Dior case clarified the ruling of the Court in the Hermés case, which some
had understood as the Court had jurisdiction to rule on all provisions of mixed
agreements falling within the Community's exclusive or non-exclusive competence
in general295 and on all provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in particular.296
From the ruling in the Dior case one can come to different conclusions.  It is
possible to argue that the judgement gives no guidance on the question whether
the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of a mixed agreement falling
within the non-exclusive competence of the Community.  It is also possible to
argue that according to the ruling the Court does not have jurisdiction to interpret
provisions of mixed agreements, in fields where the Community has not exercised
its competences, save where the provision whose interpretation is sought is a
procedural provision applicable to both situations covered by Community law and
to situations covered by national law.297
From the ruling one can, on the other hand, conclude that the Court has
jurisdiction under Article 234 EC to interpret mixed agreements whenever they
contain provisions such as Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement that are capable of
applying both to situations within Community competence and to situations within
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MS competence, irrespectively of whether the dispute before the national court
falls within Community or MS Competences.298
4.3.3 The effects of the provisions of the WTO Agreement
within the Community
The Court in general declined the provision of GATT 1947 from having direct
effect.  In the International Fruit case299 the Court outlined two conditions for
an incompatibility of a Community measure with provisions of an international
agreement can affect the validity of the measure.  Those conditions are; a)
Community must be bound by the provisions of the international law in question,
b) the provision of international law must also be capable of conferring rights on
citizens of the Community, which can be invoked before the Courts.
The Court answered the first question by stating that in so far as the
Community has assumed the powers previously exercised by the MS in the are
covered by the GATT 1947 it has the effect of binding the Community.300
Concerning the latter question, on the other hand, the Court came to the
conclusion that the provision of GATT 1947 in question, where not capable of
conferring on citizens of the Community rights which they could invoke before the
Courts.301
In the Banana case302 Germany challenged a Community act,303 which
restricted its previously liberal banana import regime, claiming it breached GATT
1947 rules.304
Germany tried to distinguish its claim from prior jurisprudence in the
International Fruit case arguing that compliance with GATT 1947 rules was a
condition of the lawfulness of Community acts, regardless of any question as to
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the direct effect of GATT 1947, and that the Regulation infringed certain basic
provisions of GATT 1947.305
The Court nevertheless rejected Germany's claim referring to its ruling in
International Fruit case by stating the GATT 1947 rules were not unconditional
and that an obligation to recognize them as rules of international law, which are
directly applicable in the domestic legal systems of the Contracting Parties could
not be based on the spirit, general scheme or terms of GATT 1947.306
It cannot be denied that the provisions of GATT 1947 were more flexible
and conditional than for example certain provisions of the Treaty, or most of the
domestic legislation of the MS.307  However, the GATT 1994 is, by any measure,
less flexible and conditional than the GATT 1947.308
Some have argued that the granting of direct effect to the GATT rules is
really a political question,309 which the Court should refrain from and must be
looked upon in context of the approach taken by Community's trading partners
and fellow contracting parties in the WTO, such as the USA.  Based on this it is
argued that this refusal is at least partly because other states and trading partners
of the Community and its MS, did not accord direct effect, to the provisions of
the GATT 1947, nor do they to the WTO Agreement and the Agreements
covered by it.  It would therefore create a bargaining disparity, which would have
to be adjusted if the trading partners of the Community denied direct effect to
these obligations while the Community accorded them direct effect.310
This notion of reciprocity was addressed in the Kaupferberg case,311 which
concerned association agreement.  In that case the Court rejected the argument of
reciprocity, as a basis, for rejection of direct effect by stating that the fact that the
Court of one of the parties to and international agreement, "consider that certain
of the stipulation in the agreement are of direct application whereas the courts of
the other party do not recognize such direct application is not in itself such as to
constitute a lack of reciprocity in the implementation of the agreement.312
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4.3.3.1 Portuguese textile
In the Portuguese textile case,313the Court cited the Kaupferberg case
concerning the rejection of the argument of reciprocity.314  However, the Court
continued by stating that the lack of reciprocity in that regard on the part of the
Community's trading partners, in relation to the WTO Agreement, which are
based on `reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements' and which must
ipso facto be distinguished from the agreement in question in the Kaupferberg
case, may lead to disuniform application of the WTO rules.315
To accept that the role of ensuring that Community law complies with those
rules devolves directly on the Community's judicature would deprive the
legislative or executive organs of the Community of the scope for manoeuvre
enjoyed by their counterparts in the Community's trading partners.316
The Court then concluded by stating that following those considerations, and
having regard to their nature and structure, the WTO Agreements, are not in
principle among the rules in the light of which the Court is to review the legality of
measures adopted by the Community institutions.317
4.3.3.2 The Dior case
As already mentioned the Court in the Dior case was asked to clarify
whether Article 50(6) of TRIPS has direct effect;318 and to interpret the term
"intellectual property right" in Article 50(1) of the TRIPS Agreement.319
The Court after having accepted the admissibility of the reference for a
preliminary ruling and declared that it had jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of the
TRIPS Agreement, where the judicial authorities of the MS are called upon to
order provisional measures for the protection of intellectual property rights falling
within the scope of the TRIPS Agreement and a case is brought before the court
of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty in particular Article 234
EC thereof.
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First the Court recalled its earlier rulings on the effects of agreements entered
into by the Community with non-member countries, by stating the it is settled case
law that provisions of such agreements must be regarded as being directly
applicable when, regard being had to the wording, purpose and nature of the
agreement, it may be concluded that the provisions contain a clear, precise and
unconditional obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to
the adoption of any subsequent measures.320
Secondly, the court recalled its ruling in the Portuguese textile case where it
was stated that the provisions of TRIPS, are not such as to create rights upon
which individuals may rely directly before the courts by virtue of Community
law.321
The Court therefore concluded that the provisions of TRIPS do not have
direct effect in that sense, but admitted that that conclusion did not resolve the
problem raised by the national court.
In an effort to resolve the problem the Court continued by referring to its
earlier judgement in the Hermés case, by stating that Article 50(6) of the TRIPS
Agreement is a procedurals provision intended to be applied by Community and
national courts in accordance with obligations assumed, both by the Community
and by the MS.
Then it stated that it follows from the judgement in Hermés,322 that the judicial
authorities of the MS are required by virtue of Community law, when called upon
to apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional measures for the
protection of rights falling within a field to which TRIPS applies and the
Community has already legislated, to do so as far as possible in the light of the
wording and purpose of Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement.323 Therefore it can
be concluded from this ruling that in fields, where the Community has already
legislated, Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement can have the so-called "indirect
effect."324
The logic is, presumably, that in fields which the Community has exercised its
legislative powers and the TRIPS Agreement applies, it is to be regarded as
falling within the exclusive competences of the Community and constituting
common rules depriving the MS of the right to act individually or even collectively
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in the sense of the ERTA case,325 which must not be affected by different
interpretations by courts of the MS.326 Concerning fields in respect of which the
Community has not yet legislated and which consequently fall within the
competence of the MS, the Community law neither requires not forbids that the
legal order of a MS accords to individuals the right to rely directly on the rule laid
down by Article 50(6) of the TRIPS Agreement or whether it obliges the courts
to apply that rule of their own motion.327
Concerning the last question, the interpretation of the term "intellectual
property right" the Court, after having confirmed that no Community legislation
existed in the filed of the protection of industrial design, concluded by stating that
Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement leaves to the Contracting Parties, within the
framework of their own legal systems, the task of specifying whether the right to
sue under general provisions of national law concerning wrongful acts, in
particular unlawful competition, in order to protect an industrial deign against
copying is to be classified as an "intellectual property right" within the meaning of
Article 50(1) of the TRIPS Agreement.328
4.3.3.3 Summary
In the Dior case the Court stated that is it settled Case law that a provision
of an agreement entered into by the Community with non-member countries can
be directly applicable under certain conditions.329
The Court then referred to the Portuguese textile case where the Court
came to the conclusion that the WTO Agreement and its annexes, having regard
to their nature and structure, are not in principle among the rules in the light of
which the Court is to review the legality of measures adopted by the Community
institutions.330  In other words based on the general characteristics of the WTO
system the direct effect of the rules within the Community legal system is ruled
out.
The Dior case confirmed this conclusion and in particular made it clear that
the WTO Agreement and the annexes, including the TRIPS Agreement, are
denied of direct effect.331  On the other hand the, judgement recalled its earlier
ruling in the Hermés case and stated that when judicial authorities of the MS are
required by virtues of Community law, when called upon to apply national rules
with a view to ordering provisional measures for the protection or rights falling
within such a field, to do so as far as possible in the light of the working and
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purpose of Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement.  I other words, even if the
provision concerned is not directly effective, the national courts are required to
take account of it when interpreting national legislation.332
This has been called an "indirect effect"333 of Article 50 of the TRIPS
Agreement.  However, as the Court stated this obligation on the national courts, is
only applicable when dealing with measures for the protection of rights falling
within a field, which the Community has already legislated, and falls therefore
under the scope of Community law.
Concerning fields not falling within the scope of Community law the
Community law neither requires not forbids the national courts to rely directly on
the rule laid down by Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement or to oblige the national
courts to apply that rule of their own motion.334
This conclusion opens up the question of the jurisdiction of the Court in areas
where not Community legislation exists and which therefore fall within the MS
competences.  As Heliskoski continues,335 the more coherent strategy would
seem to have been to initially exclude them from the Court's jurisdiction, as
proposed by the Advocate General.336
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5 Conclusions
In the extensive Opinion 1/94 on the WTO Agreement, the Court came to the
conclusion that all of the Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods fell within the
common commercial policy and therefore within the exclusive competences of the
Community.  The Court, on the other hand, concluded that a large part of GATS
and almost all of the TRIPS Agreement fell outside the scope of the common
commercial policy and that the Community and the MS had shared the
competences to conclude those Agreements.
The GATS and the TRIPS Agreement are therefore what is called mixed
agreements.  In Chapter 3.3.2.1 I discuss the types of mixed agreements, and as
stated there the WTO Agreement can be described as a concurrent mixed
agreement for a part of the agreement fall within the exclusive competence of the
Community, but they share their competences in other fields, and it is not possible
to distinguish between their competences in those fields.337
As stated there are a numerous problems linked to mixed agreements and it
is likely, that the importance of the WTO Agreement for world trade as for the
interest of the Community and individual MS will underline these problems.
The critique on the Opinion was for one, based on the need of "unitary
representation" of the Community interests within the WTO for there are 15 MS
and in many fields they have different interest, which their governments will be
tempted to pursue, possibly on the cost of unified representation of the MS.  This
will also make the position of the Community weaker within the WTO, for third
countries will most certainly, try to come up between the MS if that may possibly
serve their own interests.
This is not the only critique.  The most serious one by my opinion relates to
the vague argumentation of the Court for the ruling.338 The critics also pointed out
that the Court had missed an opportunity to develop the Community's common
commercial policy by defining the concept narrowly while the international trade
system was expanding in scope and therefore the concept within the Community
did not follow the international trends.  Critics also looked at the Opinion as a
missed opportunity for the Community and Europe to represent itself externally in
the WTO as a unified entity.
Concerning implied powers of the Community the Court made it clear that
the MS only loose their power to enter into agreements with third countries to the
extent that common rules have been established within the Community, which
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might be affected by such agreement.  Only where common rules have been laid
down internally does the Community's competence become exclusive.  The Court
also pointed out that there was nothing in the Treaty to prevent the institutions
from establishing, within the framework of common rules, a concerted approach
to third countries or from laying down the approach to be taken by MS to the
outside world.  On the contrary, the Court emphasized the duty of co-operation
between the Community and the MS, not least because of the nature of the WTO
Agreement and the possibility of cross retaliation, which it offers.
In subsequent case law the Court has clarified the jurisdiction of the Court to
interpret provisions of the WTO Agreement.  In Portuguese textile case,
Hermés case and last but not lastly, in the Dior case, on can assume that the
Court has jurisdiction to interpret procedural provisions, such as Article 50 of the
TRIPS Agreement, which should be applied in the same way in every situation
falling within its scope and is capable of applying both to situations covered by
national law and to situations covered by Community law.  This is based on the
need, for practical and legal reasons, that the judicial bodies of the MS and the
Community give a uniform interpretation.
The Court on the other hand did not clearly write-off the possibility of the
Courts jurisdiction regarding provisions of the WTO Agreement, falling
exclusively under MS competences.
The Court has also developed and modified the effects of the WTO
Agreement from the GATT 1947, which was bluntly denied of direct effect within
the Community's legal order.  In the most recent case law concerning Article 50
of the TRIPS Agreement the Court has denied it of direct effect but nevertheless
it seems to have accepted "indirect effect" of the provisions of the WTO
Agreement, by stating that when judicial authorities of the MS are required by
virtues of Community law, when called upon to apply national rules with a view to
ordering provisional measures for the protection or rights falling within such a
field, to do so as far as possible in the light of the working and purpose of Article
50 of the TRIPS Agreement.  Concerning fields not falling within the scope of
Community law the Court has ruled that the Community law neither requires not
forbids the national courts to rely directly on the rule laid down by Article 50 of
the TRIPS Agreement or to oblige the national courts to apply that rule of their
own motion.
It is clear that the Community is perpetually extending its legislation to new
fields and harmonizing fields, which are under its competences according to
Article 3 EC.  This new legislation, can, according to the case law, extend the
implied exclusive external competences of the Community.  Nevertheless, it is
likely that problems concerning the implementation of the WTO Agreement, and
questions concerning the compatibility of Community acts with the WTO
stipulations will arise.  Questions concerning the effects of the provisions of the
WTO Agreement, within Community's legal order will arise for the notion of
indirect effect is somewhat unclear.  It is though unlikely in my opinion that the
Court will extend the effects further in the foreseeable future, to a direct effect, for
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that calls for a significant changes in the political attitude towards the WTO
Agreement, which are not within the purview of the Court to change.
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